

Migration, Urbanization, Social Change and Poverty Reduction in Africa

E.K. Campbell
Department of Population Studies
University of Botswana
Gaborone, Botswana

Prepared for the UAPS Session on Migration and Urbanization at ALAP's
Conference in Cuba, November 2010

Migration, Urbanization, Social Change and Poverty Reduction in Africa

E.K. Campbell

Introduction

The history and contemporary dynamics of the population in Sub Saharan Africa (henceforth referred to as Africa) are quite complex. Though much of what is known of the region since the 1970s may not be encouraging, it was not always the case. From a relatively primitive state, events during the colonial and early post-colonial periods influenced positive socioeconomic and infrastructural development in many countries. The fertility and mortality levels declined while education and health improved considerably and poverty declined in some countries, such as Botswana. These developments owe much to the rapid urbanization that has occurred in the region since the 1950s. However, the gains that were made in the health of children and the youth up to the 1980s were adversely affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, in particular. Several economies stalled between the 1970s and 1990s due to corruption, structural adjustment programmes and culture-induced work ethics which stifled production and economic development. The advent of political independence in Africa left several governments seemingly pressured to invest in industrial development, education and non-existing infrastructure, all of which served to attract rural populations to the cities. The resultant exodus from production of primary products to producing tertiary goods and services hurt the national economy considerably. Some countries, such as Nigeria, were transformed from exporter to importer of essential foodstuff. Meanwhile, limitation in the labour-absorptive capacity of urban areas has increased the state of urban unemployment and poverty. The effects of this include over-crowded settlements and environmental health hazards in urban areas. The social change component in this paper is incorporated in various sections, especially urbanization and international migration.

Internal Migration

Though interest in international migration has bloomed during the past two decades, it has not been the same with internal migration. This is partly because globalization has influenced research to focus more on macroeconomic development issues than on microeconomic effects of internal migration. An additional contributor is a shift in research interest, which began in the late 1960s, which saw international funding agencies preferring research on issues of family planning and reproductive health. Hence, not much has been added to what is known about internal migration in Africa since 1980. Classic migration theories indicate that internal migration of Africans occurred predominantly from rural to urban areas (Ravenstein, 1989; Lee, 1966; Todaro, 1969). This is partly due to measurement problems as well as the definitions of urban places. The migration ratio has often been used to measure migration streams when the migration rate is more appropriate (Campbell, 1988). As Byerlee et al (1976) demonstrated, net rural-rural migration was greater than net rural-urban migration in Sierra Leone in the 1970s. To a lesser extent than it was in Asia, rural-rural migration was dominant in Sub-Saharan Africa. Among the factors which motivated this pattern of movement are agricultural produce, mining, land consolidation and human resettlement schemes (Oucho 1997). The establishment of rubber and cocoa plantations in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, resettlement of people whose villages would be flooded by the construction of Akosombo Dam in Ghana, the villagization scheme, *ujamaa*, in Tanzania and integrated rural development programmes in Botswana are examples of events which fostered migrations from rural to rural areas in the sub-continent.

However, given the effects of centralized investments in many East and West African countries on cityward migration, it is plausible to conclude that by 1990 net rural-urban migration would have surpassed net movements between rural areas. The timing of censuses in the region posed additional problems for measuring patterns of migration. In several countries, such as Guinea, Gabon, Uganda and South Africa, the census dates were not consistent (Census Bureau, 2008). Where censuses were done during non-farming periods, it would not capture the numerous circular movements that occurred with seasonal crop farming. During the post-colonial period, hundreds of thousands of people were forced to migrate due to ethnic and religious conflicts and other military warfare. Sierra Leone and Liberia are among countries where displacement of people occurred during civil wars, with many seeking refuge in the cities. Meanwhile, Nigeria's civil war in the late 1960s and early 1970s forced scores of thousands of nationals back to their areas of origin. Similar movements occurred in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Côte d'Ivoire. Forced migration has not always been due to military activities. For example, a decision by the Ethiopian government to resettle pastoralists was quite disturbing to the migrants. Apart from difficulty with food security, the resettlement exposed them to new diseases such as malnutrition, schistosomiasis and malaria (Prothero, 1994).

Throughout Africa, the dominance of females in short distance migration is consistent with Ravenstein's (1889) law to that effect. Also common was the dominance of males in overall migration within countries. This is partly because men were most important in the migration decision process. But there have been exceptions to this rule. Botswana is among few countries where women migrated internally more than men (Gwebu, 1987, Van der Post, 1995). Between 1975 and 1982 54-55% of migrants within Botswana were females. By 1991 the excess of females dropped to less than 1% (i.e. 49.7% males and 50.2% females). The low sex ratio of internal migrants in Botswana is largely explained by the overall sex ratio of Botswana plus the dominance of men among labour emigrants to South Africa to work in mines and cities in the 19th and 20th centuries. An additional explanation proposed by Gwebu (1987, 191) is "a growth in the number of traditionally, female-performed domestic jobs in the towns resulting from increases in civil servants' salaries and an influx of expatriates". Though these explanations are plausible, the levelling out of the sex ratio among internal migrants may be partly due to the remarkable reduction of migrant labour from Botswana to South African mines from the 1970s. But this was happening at a time when women in Botswana were becoming increasingly economically and socially more developed. Between 1981 and 1991 female employees in the formal sector alone grew at an average annual rate of 13% compared to 8% for males. Corresponding percentages for women and men who were self-employed were 14 and 9, respectively. Meanwhile the annual growth rate of the economically inactive was lower among women (5%) than men (8%) and the same is true for those who left the lands and cattle post (Botswana 1994). A demographic effect of females dominating internal migration is the progressive reduction of sex ratio in urban areas.

Social factors, including bright lights, have been inappropriately accorded the principal motivators of internal migration in Africa. Much of this error is due to methodological issues. Among these is the inappropriate use of the *de facto* migrant, where the *de jure* approach would have been appropriate. In the case of Botswana, this situation produced a misleading result that the citizens migrate within the country primarily for visitations (see Chapter 7 in Botswana 2009). Frequent use of a single question to obtain migrants reason for moving also contributes to the error. The dominance of women and children among all migrants produced reasons that were social (e.g. marriage, schooling, fostering) instead of those that were sequential to the decision of the male head of household, which were primarily economic. Actually, the primary motive for

internal migration in Africa since the 20th Century is consistent with the economic and Ravenstein's theories of migration (Ravenstein, 1889; Todaro, 1969). This could be obtained from administering multiple questions about the reason for moving and taking the average of the responses. Among the economic reasons for moving was the influence of hut taxes which several households could not afford from rural incomes (Lugalla, 1997).

Migration and Rural Development

With limited education and electronic technology before the 1970s, internal migration in Africa seemed quite significant for socioeconomic development in urban and rural areas. High levels of rural-urban migration prompted increased call for internal migration policies to curb this situation. Rural development seemed the most appropriate of explicit policies that could assist the achievement of this goal. This idea features clearly in the national development plans of several West and East African countries. To economists, the rationale for rural development was its potential stabilizing effects on rural dwellers by making them less mobile. Demographers bought the idea partly because a crucial assumption in demographic analytical techniques is the near absence of migration within and between countries. Rural development is based on the realization that rural-urban migration is driven by the desire to improve the living standards of migrants and the families they left at the origin. If the economic and social opportunities that attract migrants to urban centres were established in rural areas, the volume of rural out-migration would reduce substantially. However, this school of thought is flawed by the relationship between migration and development. Improving the person wellbeing of people makes them potentially more mobile than otherwise. This is what has now been realized about the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) and overseas development aid (ODA) on international migration as remittances from international migrants become increasing more rewarding to families in home countries than FDI and ODA.

In several West and East African countries, rural development failed to stabilize rural populations partly because when people become developed their personal aspirations rise, thereby extending the threshold of satisfaction to the extent that satisfaction levels fall. Exposing rural populations to some education, for example, increases the urge for further education. In some cases, the aspiration may be realized up to secondary school level. But where the goal was to attain post-secondary school education, migration would be undertaken because of limited higher institutions in rural areas. Where the aspiration was to achieve a university degree, the individual may have had no alternative but to migrate to the city. The failure of rural development in these regions was also due to its high implementation costs where long term planning was based on centralized investment. It is difficult to provide services that would equate the quality of those in the city. There should also be political willingness to commit to such expensive projects and to avoid all forms of corruption. Still, there is no certainty that decentralizing administration and investment would eventually reduce rural poverty. At the individual and family levels, there may be escape from poverty through migrant remittances and investment. But there is not yet sufficient evidence that remitting to rural areas significantly influence poverty.

A case of best practice in regard occurred in Botswana where it was decided at independence to implement a vigorous rural development policy which was largely designed to extend economic and social development to the total population of the country. Its most notable contribution to population growth was in the country is its stemming of cityward migration to the extent that the city primacy of Gaborone is among the lowest in Africa. The primacy index for Gaborone was 0.809 in 2001. This compares favourably with primacy indices of 2.214, 3.520 and 1.615 for

Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria, respectively, in the 1970s (Campbell, 1988). The successful implementation of rural development in Botswana is due primarily to good management, transparency, the adoption of an approach synonymous with the theory of intervening opportunities and introduction of appropriate technology. Whereas integrated rural development succeeded in Botswana, it failed especially in West Africa due to the inability of governments to follow prescribed measures for successful goal attainment (Campbell 1988; Salau 1988). Primarily because no government in Africa has successfully linked integrated rural development with migration control, this approach has not quite succeeded in stemming cityward migration. Indeed, Botswana's success at attaining rural development helped to accelerate movements of people from rural to urban areas, and eventually to Gaborone (Campbell 1998).

Urbanization in Africa

Considering the diverse definitions of urban areas, the history of urbanization in Sub Saharan Africa dates back to the twelfth century when trade activities between West and North Africa led to the expansion of several settlements into cities. These cities developed initially in places like Mali and Benin (Rokadi, 1997). However, as Njoh (2003) observed, global urbanization did not really take off till the industrial revolution gained momentum in the 19th century. Moreover, most of the global urban centres actually began appearing in the 20th century. In Africa, the first cities developed in places like Mali and Benin. But urban development in the region has been influenced by several factors, including slave trade, colonial administration, post-independence political economy and culture. The impact of slave trade is not clear; but there are indications that the administrative strategies of the colonialists had significant impact on urbanization. Before the 1940s, British colonies did not seem to move towards city primacy largely because the British practiced a system of indirect rule which favour decentralized investment. They allowed efficient subordination of colonial populations through indigenous political systems and encouraged ethnic identity. For example, Nigeria was divided into three regions (north, south-west and east) and each region was governed separately. Lagos, the capital city and major port, only grew dramatically after the country's independence. To the contrary, the French colonial administration was highly centralized and autocratic. It ignored the indigenous ruling system, focusing instead on the assimilation of its colonial populations. The assimilation policy encouraged population concentration in capital cities more so than the British administrative policy did.

The definition of urban centre differs between countries; but it is generally expressed in terms of threshold population size. For example, in South Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria, urban settlements have a minimum of 500, 2,000, 5,000 and 20,000 persons, respectively (Campbell, 1998; United Nations, 2005). Ideally, the definition should include the functional component of urban centres. Hence in Botswana, an urban centre has a threshold of 5,000 people with at least 75% of its labour force employed in non-agricultural sectors. Similarly, Zambia's urban centres have 5,000 or more people, the "majority of who depend on non-agricultural activities" (United Nations, 2005). Africa has the highest urban annual population growth rate currently in the world. Between 2005 and 2010 it was 3.7% (United Nations 2010). But this is particularly reflective of the region's slow start at urbanizing plus the effects of high fertility, declining mortality and national economic programmes which have encouraged considerable rural to urban migration. In Table 1, the countries with the fastest growing urban populations include Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Burundi, and Malawi. Notwithstanding the lack of difference in the levels of urbanization of the countries which were colonized by the British and French in 1950, the effect of colonial administration on urban growth in the region was clear during the post-colonial period. From Table 1 it was obtained that the former French colonies attained higher levels of

Table 1: Urban Growth and Other Characteristics in Sub Saharan Africa

Country	1950	Percentage Urban					Avg. Ann. Growth (%) 2005-2010	TFR* 2005-2010	Life* Expectancy	Unemployment** Rate.(%)
Burkina Faso	3.8	6.4	17.8	19.1	29.1	48.4	5.0	5.9	53	2.0
Côte d'Ivoire	10.0	32.2	43.5	48.2	59.8	73.7	3.2	4.6	57	4.0
Gambia	10.3	24.4	49.1	55.7	68.1	81.0	4.2	5.1	56	
Ghana	15.4	30.1	44.0	49.3	61.6	75.6	3.5	4.3	57	10.0
Guinea	6.7	19.5	30.1	33.9	45.0	62.9	3.5	5.5	58	
Liberia	13.0	30.1	44.3	59.5	70.9	83.1	5.6	5.1	58	6.0
Mali	8.5	16.2	28.3	31.6	43.6	62.3	4.8	5.5	48	9.0
Nigeria	10.2	25.5	42.5	47.6	60.3	75.4	3.8	5.3	48	4.0
Senegal	17.2	33.7	40.4	42.0	50.0	65.7	3.1	5.0	55	11.0
Sierra Leone	12.7	26.8	35.5	37.4	45.7	62.4	2.9	5.2	47	3.0
Burundi	1.7	3.2	8.3	10.1	17.1	33.3	6.8	4.7	50	1.0
Ethiopia	4.6	9.5	14.9	16.6	24.2	42.1	4.3	5.4	55	17.0
Kenya	5.6	12.9	19.7	21.3	29.6	48.1	4.0	5.0	54	10.0
Malawi	3.5	7.7	15.2	18.3	28.8	48.5	5.2	5.6	53	8.0
Mauritius	29.3	43.4	42.7	42.3	47.9	63.4	0.9	1.8	72	7.0
Mozambique	2.4	8.7	30.7	36.1	50.1	67.4	4.1	5.1	48	2.0
Rwanda	1.8	4.0	13.8	18.0	25.2	42.9	4.2	5.4	50	1.0
Seychelles	27.4	46.3	51.1	53.8	63.9	76.2	1.4	-	-	6.0
Uganda	2.8	7.0	12.1	12.8	18.0	33.5	4.4	6.4	52	3.0
Tanzania	3.5	11.2	22.3	25.0	35.1	54.0	4.2	5.6	55	
Zambia	11.5	34.9	34.8	35.2	41.5	58.4	2.3	5.9	45	13.0
Zimbabwe	10.6	19.9	33.8	36.8	47.2	64.3	2.2	3.5	44	4.0
Angola	7.6	19.1	49.0	55.8	69.0	80.5	4.4	5.8	47	
Cameroon	9.3	27.3	49.9	56.0	68.4	79.9	3.5	4.7	51	8.0
Dem. Rep. of Congo	19.1	29.5	29.8	33.3	45.6	63.2	2.7	6.1	47	
Gabon	11.4	43.0	80.2	84.7	89.7	93.5	2.1	3.4	60	18.0
Botswana	2.7	11.9	53.2	58.9	70.3	81.1	2.5	2.9	55	18.0
Lesotho	1.4	10.8	20.0	24.7	38.5	58.1	3.5	3.4	45	27.0
Namibia	13.4	23.7	32.4	36.2	47.9	65.3	2.9	3.4	61	22.0
South Africa	42.2	48.1	56.9	60.2	69.0	79.6	1.4	2.6	52	23.0
Swaziland	1.8	14.0	22.6	24.6	33.6	51.9	1.7	3.6	46	23.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	11.0	21.7	32.7	35.9	45.2	60.5	3.7	5.1	51	
Developed Countries	52.6	66.7	72.7	74.4	79.0	86.0	0.5	1.6	77	

Source: United Nations (2010a) *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision*, Figure 2. * United Nations (2009) *World Population 2008*.

** United Nations (2010b) Social Indicators.

urbanization before their British counterparts. While 66.7% of the former French colonies had thirty or more percent of their population living in urban areas, in 1975, the corresponding proportion of former British colonies was 25%. This difference is partly attributed to the assimilation policy of France.

Though Africa has over a quarter of the fifty fastest growing cities in the world, the ability of the region's cities to attract income is low. The few rich cities in the region are in South Africa and Kenya, with Johannesburg and Nairobi ranking 43rd and 68th among the world's seventy richest cities (CMS, 2010). Among the requirements for cities to attain economic efficiency is their ability to mobilize income independently. The South African economy is the only one in Africa with industries and cities which rival those in the developed region of the world. Several of its cities (including Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban) have the capacity to develop themselves from internally mobilized funds. Meanwhile, some apparently rich cities, such as Gaborone, may not be classified as rich because their annual incomes depend mostly on grants from the national government. The dependency of most cities in the region on government disbursement of funds contributes to the low performance of their economies. In this regard, it is difficult to separate the economic performance of urban areas in Africa with the parent countries. The economic performance of African countries has been the worst in the world since the industrial revolution of the 19 century. It is estimated that the region's per capita income in 1992 is lower than that of Western Europe in 1820. Generally the economies of the region performed well during the colonial period and up to the 1960s (Collier and Gunning, 1999). However, largely due to economic mismanagement and political instability, the per capita income of SSA declined continuously from 1.5% in the 1960s to -1.2% in the 1980s (Bloom and Sachs, 1998).

Factors Influencing Urban Growth

Considering that, with few exceptions, the economies of post-independence African countries have not done well it may be surprising that urbanization has increased remarkably in the same period. But it is not as surprising as it may seem. While urbanization may be associated with positive development, its definition is mostly based on population size. The region's population size has been influenced largely by traditional norms which favour large families, especially in the period preceding 1990. They include preference for sons, child utility as insurance against old age economic inertia, male dominance and inheritance. To these should be added high levels of unmet need for contraceptives. Several scholars have demonstrated that the cultural props in Africa have fuelled high fertility even where mortality was declining, resulting in high population growth rates (Caldwell, 1978; Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987, 1990; Kirk and Pillet, 1998). Though significant differences exist in the fertility of urban and rural populations, these cultural props have also kept urban fertility higher than it should be.

The economic growth of African urban centres during the early post-colonial period relied considerably on the mass of rural labour. Due to inadequate statistics from censuses and vital registration systems, the actual size of the rural labour force is unattainable. However, considering that 86% of Africans lived in rural areas between 1950 and 1965 (United Nations, 2009), most of the labour required to develop the construction, commercial and industrial sectors of the cities and other urban centres was obtained from rural areas. Though Africa's major export products were agricultural, this sector has not done as well as it did in Asia and Latin America because of poor soils, inconsistent rainfall patterns and very high temperatures in the region (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Collier and Gunning, 1999). The decision by many post-colonial governments to embrace import-substituting manufacturing industries provided employment opportunities for the youths. It also promised to improve the annual income of skill rural folks,

thereby attracting many of those in rural areas who could not mobilize similar earnings. As was the case in 19th century Europe, many youth and adult males who perceived their skills to be marketable, migrated to the city.

According to Malthus (1970), a population that fails to regulate its fertility would eventually be in a state of economic and social poverty. High level of rural poverty in Africa is a major contributor to rapid rural-urban migration in the region. In several countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia, rural poverty increased partly because of the economic recovery programmes imposed by the International Monetary Fund as a condition for lending financial aid to these countries. While World Bank reports of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) paints a glowing picture of it, it was apparent by the mid-1980s that the macroeconomic measures put in place by the cooperative governments did not quite address the micro level population development issues, especially in the rural areas. Notwithstanding that SAP may have succeeded somewhat in some countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria, there was no significant difference between the wellbeing of people in countries with World Bank aid and those that did not (Rakodi, 1997). In a ground-breaking study, Becker and Morrison (1988) observed the compelling effects of “push” over “pull” factors in rural-urban migration in Africa. Given the rapid of agriculture in the region from the 1970s, this observation seems plausible. However, considering the limitations of the assumptions employed in their macroeconomic model, it is safe to conclude that the “pull” factors are equally as important as the “push” factors in decisions to move from rural areas.

Effects of Urbanization

Several gravity models indicate that, even at the beginning, rural-urban migration would not have occurred in the absence of urban influences (Ewing, 1974; Henry et al., 2003). It is therefore logical that a considerable part of the process and effects of urbanization is associated with the contribution of national and international migration. Rural-urban migration has played a significant role in annual urban population growth in Africa. For instance, between 1981 and 1991, net internal migration contributed 70% and 56% to the population growth of the Gaborone, the capital city, and Francistown, the second largest city (Campbell, 1998). But, on average, the effect of migration on urban growth in Botswana is falling (Gwebu, 2006). Similarly, Africa’s urban growth declined considerably between the 1960s and 1990s (Beauchemin and Schoumaker, 2005). It is well known that several African import-substituting industries failed to be economically viable (Rakodi, 1997). But these manufacturing industries were necessary to develop the urbanization process in which rural values are transformed into urbanity and the traditional into modernity. Whatever successes were attained through manufacturing and construction industries as well as other socioeconomic institutions occurred because of the physical and mental contributions of labour migrants. However, these migrants had little to do with the economic efficiency of most African cities. Much of the dysfunctional states of the cities are due to bad economic, political and managerial policies, which were centralized in many countries. The effects of implicit migration policies in West and East Africa include rapid population growth, city primacy, urban poverty and inability of the population to attain modernity. Among the few countries in which this has not quite occurred is Botswana. This is partly due to the wise decision of politicians to implement a policy of decentralized investment when the country attained independence.

A significant effect of urbanization on population growth was a change in fertility attitudes of urban dwellers from preferences for large families (i.e. 5+ children) to small families (1-4 children). An effect of high educational attainment and access to international technology in

urban areas is the adoption of fertility regulation. Hence, the average family sizes in urban areas fell significantly below that in rural areas (Kirk and Pillet, 1998). In West and East Africa, urban fertility decline was accelerated by the declining national economies in these regions in the 1970s and 1980s (Caldwell et al., 1992; Campbell, 1993; Dow et al, 1994). Largely due to unfavourable economic growth and hot climate, African urbanization has not had the anticipated mitigating effect on the incidence of vector-borne diseases, such as malaria. Most of the region is endemic with malaria. The few exceptions are in the Horn and southern Africa. The rapid growth of Africa's urban population has serious consequences for the spread of the disease in what should otherwise be the developed part of the region. Though malaria seems to be higher in urban than rural areas, urban poverty is quite high and the poor have about as much exposure to malaria infection as the rural populations. Keiser et al (2004) estimate that there are between 25 and 103 million malaria cases in the urban areas every year and that approximately 200 urban dwellers are at risk of contracting the disease. However, there is likelihood of variations in the transmission of the disease in urban centres (Trape & Zoulani, 1987; Robert et al., 2003).

The Urban Informal Sector

The participation of African men and women in the urban informal sector has been a poverty alleviating mechanism since the colonial period, although, as Lugalla (1997) observed, access to the informal sector was limited for nationals in some African countries. Still, any form of limited access would depend on the limits set out in the definition of the concept. Among them is one which Trager (1987, 239) prefers most and which seems quite plausible. It expresses the informal sector "as encompassing all income-producing activities outside formal sector wages and social security payments". In this regard, activities such as street and home trading, prostitution, housekeeping and manual services on the street could be included within the informal sector. They do not usually attract tax or work permit, but may be financially rewarding. The informal sector provides employment for the unemployed and additional income for those employed with low wages. In urban centres throughout Africa domestic work is about the most common of all occupations in the informal sector. In Botswana, van Dijk (2003: 571) personally noted "thirty-one Ghanaian-owned salons and/or clothing boutiques, most of which had been established from the mid-1980s onwards". Informal economic sector hardly existed in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia before 1990, thereby contributing to the apparently high unemployment rates in these countries then. Among the contributions of migration to South Africa's economy is the introduction of the informal sector. Zimbabweans form the highest proportion of migrant street vendors. Mozambicans and, to a lesser extent, Basotho and Swazi are also quite active in promoting the informal sector in South Africa.

Zimbabweans dominate among migrants who participate in South Africa's informal sector. Tevera and Zinyama (2002) observed that, among all visitors and migrants to South Africa, the highest proportion of men and women who buy and sell goods is from Zimbabwe. Basotho, Mozambican and Namibian migrants also buy and sell goods in South Africa (Sechaba Consultants, 2002). Zimbabwean males seem to be in South Africa as much to work or look for work as it is for commerce. Meanwhile, almost three quarters of migrant women are there for commercial purposes (Tevera and Zinyama, 2002). However, there is health risk associated with some occupations in this sector. In Johannesburg, where the majority of domestic workers are females and many are internal migrants, poor family background and low wages influence sexual practices which contribute to HIV transmission in urban and rural areas in South Africa (Peberdy and Dinat, 2005). Similar concerns have been raised about street hawkers in West Africa (Anarfi and Antwi, 1995). The health risks and low real income associated with disguised unemployment and underemployment raise questions about the viability of economic rewards to many of those

who invest in the informal sector in Africa. In several institutions of higher education in the region, academics have increasingly committed their efforts to spontaneous consultancies since the 1990s. While consultancies may be financially rewarding, it reduces Africans' contribution to scholarship and personal progression in the academia.

Urbanization and Social Change

Decisions to migrate indicate desires to experience positive social and economic changes. Africans have become considerably more educated now than was the case half a century ago; and part of this change occurred through migration. Rising rural-urban movements of women contributed substantially to the acceptance and practice of effective contraceptive by Africans (Brockhoff, 1995). In Southern Africa, the remarkable success of family planning campaigns is also partly due to the modernizing effects of migration to South Africa. Unlike West Africa, family planning practice in Southern Africa was largely assisted by the encouragement women received from their male partners who worked in South African mines. The United Nations declaration of the Decade for Women in 1974 (and again in 1984) was a major turning point in the social development of women. Increased education and employment of women and legislations granting rights to women equal to those of men empowered women and considerably reduced their dependence on men. It also helped to curb the culturally accepted male supremacy among Africans. In this regard, female poverty underwent remarkable reduction in urban areas from the 1980s. Rising female socioeconomic status in Southern Africa was also assisted by the transfer of skills of female spouses of West African professionals who migrated to the region. But there have been several negative social effects of migration and urbanization, including increased marital instability. Street children are found in cities throughout the region. Meanwhile, HIV (a predominantly social disease in Africa) has left many African children orphaned and increased socioeconomic dependency of some urban and rural families.

Poverty Reduction: Is It Achievable?

The duration and severity of poverty in Africa begs the question, would the region ever attain its MDG goal of reducing poverty by 50% by 2015? Much as this goal is desirable, several factors make it seem unachievable soon. The poverty reduction strategies adopted by many African countries include attaining good governance, increase human capital, income and employment of the poor and reduce inequality (Mwabu and Thorbecke, 2004). Considering that these are not new proposals, how could these previously unattainable goals become real in a region where rampant corruption is cultural? In a region where national economies depend largely on financial aid from developed countries, the current global economic recession provides a convenient excuse to extend the date of delivery. But, as may be discerned from the following paragraphs, there are deep rooted problems associated with poverty in Africa. The international failure to agree on a singular definition may work to the advantage of those who perceive poverty alleviation as no more than a dream. Solving population problems require complete understanding of what it is and this is unlikely in the case of African poverty where continuous and reliable data are non-existent. As Barrett et al (2006) observe, the economies and societies in Africa are quite diverse; so much so that the usefulness of the interpretations of results of poverty studies in the region may remain unimportant. In some cases, it appears that there is very little political interest in knowing and publicizing the real poverty levels. In view of this, it is expedient to start with an examination of the incidence of poverty in Africa.

Regardless of the definition of poverty, Africa would be the poorest region in the world. Since the 1960s, when development was defined predominantly from an economic perspective, with per capita income as the primary factor, there has been much improvement in the knowledge of

the concept. Human development now includes social, political, psychological and biological factors and is widely acknowledged as a variable that is no longer restricted to individual and family income but serves as an index of living standards in societies (Seers, 1972; Deininger and Squire, 1996; Mattes et al, 2003). This modern interpretation of the meaning of development, and hence poverty, has led to numerous examinations of the distinctions between absolute and relative poverty and transitory and extreme/chronic poverty. By 1999, almost half of all Africans were absolutely poor and the incidence was deeper in rural areas (where 85% of the poor lived). The share of Africans on less than US\$1 a day rose from 47% in 1987, peaked at 50% in 1993 and fell to 46% in 1998 (Mwabu and Thorbecke, 2004). The statistics of annual per capita consumption in the 1990s suggest average daily consumption of less than US\$2 in many African countries (see Table 2). Very few of the region's countries had annual averages above US\$500 (Christiaensen et al, 2003). Considering the luxurious living standards of few urban families in most African countries, this observation implies high the existence of high consumption inequalities in the region. In the eight countries included in Table 2, the gini coefficients show that the consumption inequality in the 1990s ranged from 0.36 in Uganda to a high of 0.68 in Zimbabwe.

Poverty is a major contributor to south-south and south-north migration of Africans. According to Christiaensen et al (2003), the incidence of poverty in most African countries occurred primarily because of changes in national expenditure. Much of the national revenue was spent on non-essential projects and activities, contributing to the poor economic performance in SSA (Mbaku, 1988; Fosu, 1992; Sako, 2002; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2003). In Nigeria, for example, the policy of universal primary education increased enrolment far beyond government projections. Meanwhile, a decision by the military government to increase salaries, with arrears covering almost one year, hurt the country's economy considerably (Joseph, 1978; Csapo, 1983). In the 1960s Ghana overshot its Second Five Year Development Plan budget of 250 million pounds sterling by investing in large scale projects such as the Volta River Dam in Akosomo, a luxurious conference centre valued at about 15 million pounds, basic infrastructure and education (White, 2003). Added to this is the gross mismanagement of financial resources. As is widely acknowledged, corruption is at the root of poverty in Africa (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001; Johnson, 2004). Materialism, ambition and greed are among the factors that are known to have fueled corruption in the region. In several countries, increased expenditure on military hardware and services by military regimes helped to deter economic growth. For example, in Uganda, the gini coefficient rose from 0.27 (which was low (0.27) relative to many African countries) before the military regime in the 1970s to 0.33 by the end of the 1980s (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2003).

Notwithstanding the huge investments made in education by African governments, primary school enrolment still falls short of the target of full enrolment in 2015 which is among the MDGs. Table 2 shows, that net primary school enrolment increased in most countries in the 1990s. However, in several countries, even where universal primary education exists (as in Botswana), there is still resistance from families to educate their children. Giving the close relationship between education and income, education is an important factor within several others which make up the living standard index of a population. Still, notwithstanding the increase of school enrolment in Africa, the region's population is far from attaining modernity. Education is expected to improve the intellectual, social and economic wellbeing of individuals and societies; and its optimization should lead to commitment to objectivity and rationality

Table 2: Poverty Indicators in Selected African Countries in the 1990s (in percentage)

Country	Real Private	Net Primary	Under-Five	Consumption*
---------	--------------	-------------	------------	--------------

	Consumption Per Capita (constant 1995 US\$)		School Enrolment Rates		Child Malnutrition		Inequality (Gini Coefficients)	
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2	Year 1	Year 2
Ghana (1992 and 1999)	275	304	70	82	26	26	.37	.37
Nigeria (1992 and 1996)	206	173	94	98	38	-	.51	.47
Mauritania (1987 and 1995)	297	361	28	41	48	23	.43	.39
Ethiopia (1994 and 1997)	80	86	19	25	66	55	.39	.44
Madagascar (1993 and 1999)	223	222	48	64	50	49	.43	.38
Uganda (1992 and 1997)	211	258	68	86	43	39	.36	.38
Zambia (1991 and 1998)	362	266	73	66	40	42	.59	.50
Zimbabwe (1991 and 1996)	595	439	83	86	30	23	.68	.64

Source: Table 1 in Christiaensen et al (2003).

* Table 2 in Christiaensen et al (2003).

(hence the truth). That this has not been quite the case in Africa is partly due to cultural influences. At independence, it was expected that the western democracy that was introduced by the English and French would survive and develop during the post-colonial period (Crowder, 1987). But modern democracy and its accompanying civilization were swiftly abandoned in favour of the familiar village politic and the end of individuality in several countries after independence. Among the effects of this are bad governance, violation of human rights, economic corruption and the complacency in the wake of organizational politics and brain drain.

The association between poverty and disease cannot be easily challenged and events in Africa indicate this much. The reduced real income and heightened income inequality which accompanied the structural adjustment programmes influenced increased tendency towards risky sexual behaviour. Risky sexual activities and commercial sex work have been associated with poverty and HIV transmission in Africa (Bure et al, 2002). In South Africa poverty is a significant motivator of substance abuse and HIV transmission (Kalichman et al, 2006). HIV, in turn, has several effects on poverty in the region. In Lesotho, Kenya and South Africa, the impoverishment of especially rural households by HIV occurs through its limiting effects on land use. The debilitating effects of HIV on the health of infected victims and the time of the affected family members tend to minimize the utility of labour on the land (Drimie, 2003).

It is generally accepted that poverty in Africa is gender-specific. More than half of all HIV cases in the region are women, partly because their economic and biological situations make them more vulnerable than men to HIV infection. A time use study in Benin, Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa obtained that women are more time-poor than men. Though both sexes utilize

their time doing multiple tasks each day, women are more engaged in numerous work and household activities than men (Kes and Swaminathan, 2006). However, recently the reliability of the feminization of household poverty in developing countries has been increasingly questioned (Quisumbing *et al.*, 2001; Medeiros and Costa, 2006). Quisumbing *et al.* (2001) found that, while poverty exists more in female-headed than male-headed households in many developing countries the difference between these two groups of households is really not significant. In Botswana, the indications are that poverty is greater among male than female headed households, though the difference is insignificant. Chant (2007) further observed the appearance of a dominance of female headed households among those that were not poor. Several cultural props which fueled gender discrimination in Botswana have weakened considerably partly due to the government's educational policy and changes in fertility attitudes which have significantly moderated preferences for sons.

Reducing Poverty

The search for a universal definition of poverty has been fraught with considerable difficulty, with no agreement having been reached on it. This is partly due to the diverse perceptions in developed and developing societies of who are poor. Hence, while there is popular demand to reduce poverty in Africa, the realities of measurement factors make this a very difficult task. Macro-economic measures that may succeed at national levels may not quite influence the wellbeing of families and individuals to the extent desired. Laderchi *et al* (2003) have questioned whether agreement on defining poverty really matters. Though they conclude that it does, it is practically unrealistic to expect a universal definition of the concept. The important thing is to realize that if poverty was reasonably identified to be a problem, it should be curbed. Migrant remittances increasingly serve to mitigate micro-economic levels of poverty in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.

Among the approaches that have been used to reduce poverty is to address conditions which tend to produce poor people (Lampman, 1965). In the 1960s and 1970s rapid population growth was identified as a major determinant of poverty in Africa. Cultural factors which encouraged gender inequality were found to be an additional deterrent of improved living standards. Malthusian ideas on fertility and development partly influenced the thought the implementation of family planning and women's development policies would reduce poverty through enhancing standards of living of African women. The objective was to increase the quality of children and women by significantly reducing fertility and infant, child and maternal mortality. These would be achieved through education and employment, especially of women. However, the reduction of fertility in West and East Africa occurred more because of dramatic economic decline in the regions than to family planning (Campbell, 1993; Caldwell *et al*, 1992; Dow *et al*, 1994). Effectively, the modernizing effects of family planning were not achieved. It has also been found that research-based agricultural production has moderating effects on rural poverty as well as rural-urban migration (Thirtle *et al*, 2003). This serves to justify rural development policies which are designed to curb cityward migration and poverty in rural and urban areas.

According to Truong (2008) national economic and human development may be a function of good governance. There is much concern about poverty (especially among the youth) in many African countries. The high poverty levels in many African countries are largely due to corruption, coup d'états, civil wars, and brain drain. Improvement in these areas would contribute immensely to poverty reduction in the sub-continent. Botswana is among countries which have demonstrated strong commitment to maintaining democracy (electoral and more) and maximization of the quality of life of its population, especially through integrated rural

development female empowerment. Its literacy rate is among the highest in Africa while the fertility and mortality rates are among the lowest. Life expectancy is much higher than most African countries while poverty is among the lowest. Control alcohol consumption especially of women in reproductive ages. Uncontrolled alcohol consumption by pregnant and breastfeeding women may contribute to limiting the intellectual growth of their offspring because the fetus and infant would receive some of the alcohol naturally and through the breast milk. Children of mothers who drank alcohol consistently while pregnant and breastfeeding do not generally perform as well as their counterparts whose mothers abstained from alcohol during pregnancy (Campbell, 2003a). Given the high correlation between educational attainment and income, uncontrolled consumption of alcohol may have the effect of intergenerational transfer of poverty.

Considering the complex relationship between socioeconomic development and poverty, an operational approach to reduce poverty should include the diverse factors which constitute poverty. From this perspective, Chambers and Conway introduced in 1992 the sustainable livelihoods approach to achieve rural development. Subsequently, the Department of International Development (DFID) has developed the sustainable livelihoods approach to poverty reduction (Krantz, 2001). However, its attempt to address the complex nature of poverty is its greatest weakness because it does not provide for easy identification of individual groups, example poor women. Regional economic and social integration would also assist to reduce poverty significantly if African governments were to become more committed to it. Considering the numerous economic and political approaches available, there is sufficient evidence in the developed and developing world to conclude that the minimization of poverty in Africa is achievable.

International Migration and Development

Net international migration in Africa has increased considerably since the 1950s (United Nations, 2009). It is widely acknowledged that international labour migration is (and has always been) significantly related with economic and social development (Taylor, 1999; Cliggett, 2005; Adepoju, 2006). Several African countries would not have developed as much as they did in the absence of skilled and unskilled immigrants. Among all international movements, south-north migration attracted the most attention from scholars, governments and non-governmental organizations in the past largely because of perceived social and economic problems labour migrants and refugees experience plus the existing situations in destination countries. Only recently has increasing attention been called to the positive effects of regular and irregular south-north migrations. Though south-south movements have occurred in Africa since historical times, its magnitude and socioeconomic significance has also only recently been recognized. International migration in Africa has assumed new and interesting dimensions since the 1980s. It is now evident that the patterns of human movement are complex and are now more south-south than south-north (see Tables 3 and 4). These movements deal with issues that range from brain drain through the diaspora, remittances and brain circulation, to refugees, xenophobia, crime, unemployment, irregular migration and human trafficking. Table 5 indicates that the highest net emigration (-125) occurs in West Africa and this is partly explained by its long history of international migration and post-colonial economic demise. A positive effect of West African emigration is that it receives the highest volume of remittances from migrants annually.

Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Migrants from a Sample of African Countries of Emigration by Continent of Residence (2000-2002)

Country	Africa	Asia	Europe	Latin	North	Oceania
---------	--------	------	--------	-------	-------	---------

of Emigration

America and the
Caribbean

Benin	91.6	3.1	4.6	0.2	0.5	0.0
Burkina Faso	94.0	3.0	2.4	0.2	0.3	0.0
Côte d'Ivoire	47.7	3.1	43.4	0.2	5.6	0.1
Ghana	74.8	3.4	12.2	0.2	9.1	0.2
Nigeria	62.3	4.4	18.1	0.2	14.8	0.2
Togo	83.8	2.7	11.3	0.2	2.0	0.0
Ethiopia	8.6	37.5	21.4	0.2	30.7	1.5
Kenya	41.5	4.2	37.9	0.2	14.4	1.8
Seychelles	39.7	2.7	32.1	0.2	10.4	14.9
Tanzania	67.5	2.8	17.4	0.2	11.4	0.7
Congo	80.1	2.1	16.5	0.2	1.1	0.0
DR Congo	79.7	2.6	15.3	0.2	2.2	0.0
Gabon	69.9	2.1	26.1	0.2	1.7	0.0
Botswana	60.3	2.7	21.3	0.2	10.8	4.7
Lesotho	93.5	2.3	2.8	0.1	1.1	0.2
Namibia	77.8	2.5	11.3	0.2	5.4	2.7
South Africa	38.6	3.3	30.5	0.3	13.8	13.5
Swaziland	72.5	3.2	14.9	0.2	7.1	2.1

Source: United Nations (2009)

However, it is not the highest refugee-hosting region in Africa as it is ranked below East and Central Africa in this regard.

Brain drain was previously perceived from a negative perspective because of the financial and human capital loss to sending countries. The South African Migration Project studies have shown that countries in the SADC region are likely to lose much of their young professionals due primarily to economic factors (Crush et al., 2005). The brain drain was largely influenced by poor political economies. In many cases economic and criminal corruption as well as excessive expenditure on military armament affected sustained economic growth in the continent. However, one of the positive effects of brain drain is brain circulation. Brain circulation occurs when international migrants who left the home country with acquired skills to live and work elsewhere return to the home country. A major asset in this process is the additional skills that migrants return home with, having acquired new and advanced skills during their stay in host countries (Saxenian, 2005; Adepoju, 2008). The diaspora also contributes much to Africa in terms of economic, community, social, cultural and political development. Remittance is the most important economic contribution that migrants in diaspora make to Africa and it is largely sustained by the altruistic relationship between African parents and their children. The region receives the least of all official remittances to developing regions and Nigeria has been the highest recipient since 2007. Still remittances to and in Africa have increased at the fastest rate globally between 2002 and 2008.

Table 4: Foreign-Born Population in Africa by Region of Birth (2007)*

Country of	Region	of	Birth
------------	--------	----	-------

Residence	Total Foreign Born	Percentage from region				
		Africa	Europe	Americas/ Canada	Asia	Other
Benin	141595	97.3	1.3	-	-	1.4
Burkina Faso	285166	98.3	-	-	-	1.7
Burundi	65005	96.1	-	-	-	3.9
Côte d'Ivoire	1742664	98.6	-	-	-	1.4
Gabon	126489	92.5	6.2	0.3	0.7	0.3
Uganda	405782	98.3	0.8	0.2	0.6	0.1
Sierra Leone	98860	94.8	1.2	0.6	3.3	0.1
South Africa	1854561	75.8	21.8	0.6	1.0	0.8
Swaziland	31743	79.0	5.6	1.3	0.8	13.3
Zambia	141414	91.4	3.5	0.7	4.4	0.0

Source: UN (2009c) Demographic Yearbook 2007.

* Information is for countries with adequate immigration data. It excludes persons whose migration status was not known.

Table 5 Statistics of Net Migration, Refugees, etc in Africa

Country/ Region	Net Immigration (annual average)		Immigrant (as % of total pop.)	Refugees (in '000)	Remittance* (Annual)	
	Number	Rate			Total	%
	(in '000)	(per '000 of pop.)			(mil US\$)	of GDP
East Africa	- 41	- 0.2	1.6	1,515	3,238	
Central Africa	6	0.1	1.6	639	195	
Southern Africa	- 1	0.0	2.6	46	1,593	
West Africa	- 125	- 0.5	2.9	407	11,816	

Source: United Nations (2006) * United Nations (2009c)

Gendered Migration

Up to the 1960s men dominated the global international migration scene. But the dominance has reduced since then especially in developed regions where females have surpassed males among migrants. By 2000 women migrant in developed regions had exceeded their male counterparts. But less developed regions have lagged behind the more developed countries in terms of increase in the proportion of female migrants in all international migrants. Though Sub-Saharan Africa has had considerably high increase of female migrants since 1960, the acceleration of international migration of women in all of Africa has not been as fast as that Latin America. The ratio of females among all African migrants increased continuously from 41% in 1960, through 44% in 1980, to 47% in 2000 (Zlotnik, 2009). Up to 2005 African women emigrated less (47%) than the men and this situation is not likely to change in 2010. Still the overall increase of

migration by African women is remarkable considering the traditional norms that restricted movement of African women prior to the 20th Century.

Women from Africa comprised 34.1%, 38.6% and 45.7% of all immigrants entering the USA in 1982/84, 1985/89 and 1990/92, respectively (Zlotnik, 1995). Among the factors that influence increasing emigration of African women is their rising educational and economic status as well as reduced dependency due to reduced fertility and other modernization effects. Botswana is among several developing countries where the socioeconomic status of women has improved to the extent that it may be erroneous to consider women to have less access to basic and luxury assets than men. Much of the loss of skilled women is occurring through emigration of professional nurses and physicians. Some of the biggest losers of nurses are West African countries, especially Liberia, Gambia and Sierra Leone. Southern African countries, such as Botswana, Namibia and South Africa have been able to retain many of their nurses because their economic conditions are considerably better than those in East, West and Central Africa. From studies done by the International Centre on Nurse Migration (*Fact Sheet* 2008), the major motivators of nurse migration include income, job satisfaction, governance, protection and social security. These factors are practically the same as those that influence other categories of labour emigration from Africa (Campbell, 2007).

Socioeconomic Dimensions of International Migration

The dynamics of international migration and development remains complex and has been made more so by the financial crises and economic recession of 2008. The likely impacts of the financial crises on migrants include job losses, reduction in labor migration, reduction in wages, decline in remittance flows, increase in irregular migration, increased tendency in host countries towards xenophobia and increase in return migration to the home country. Africa, the poorest continent globally, depends on trade relations with developed countries especially the European Union and US. Hence there was expression of worry throughout Africa that its national economies could be hurt badly by the recession (UN/AU, 2009). By June 2009 Africa had already been seriously affected by the global financial crises. Countries which depend much on mining and manufacturing industries were the worst affected as mines were closed and thousands of workers lost jobs. In an effort to meet the modern demands of globalization, some African states have invested workers pensions, etc. in international stock markets (Griffiths, 2005). With the stocks having been severely weakened by the housing market crash in the US, many Africans had their pensions and other retirement benefits reduced substantially. Moreover, the dwindling stocks reduced the chances of making big dividends from investment in off-shore markets. It became necessary to adjust one's working life beyond what was initially planned. Meanwhile, the scourge of HIV/AIDS in the continent further complicates intentions to prolong working lives of Africans.

In 2007, it appeared that several African states were on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) even though most may have achieved it later than 2015. One of the effects of the global recession is likely to be a delay in the achievements of the MDGs. The target date may require revision particularly where the goal is to reduce absolute poverty by fifty percent. Mining and tourism industries have been hit very hard. However, several African countries reacted swiftly to the global crisis by making substantial adjustments to their financial markets and expenditures. The debt relief that was introduced by international governments in the 1990s also assisted over 20 poor and heavily indebted African countries to meet their development goals. Moreover, the banks exercised very tight credit controls relative to what obtained in Western countries. Hence, by 2007 several African countries had made remarkable

progress in their economies. While real GDP growth in Sub Saharan Africa declined from 3.5% to 1.5% between the 1970s and 1990s, it grew to over 6% between 2000 and 2007. Inflation in the region also fell to single digits by 2007 (*IMF Survey Magazine*, February 2008). The effects of global recession on international migration of skills from Africa should be seen in the context of the economic and political situation that the continent is in now versus what they were before 1990. The present political economies, including good governance and prospect for economic growth, would determine the volume of skilled migration from, to and within the continent.

Given the high levels of recession-induced unemployment in the EU and US and possible job losses in southern Africa, it seems less likely now that professional immigrants will obtain jobs easily in these places. However, much depends on the supply of special skills. The academia will continue to recruit highly skilled persons especially in southern Africa where xenophobia has contributed to reducing the availability of foreign applicants who are needed to fill professorial positions. Science and technology will also continue to attract highly skilled migrants. But demand is likely to fall in several areas such as finance where there has been proliferation of training which was in response to high global demand for these skills up to a year ago. Above all this is the personal determination to escape growing unemployment in West African countries and Zimbabwe. Studies done by SAMP in the SADC region in 2002/2003 indicated strong intentions by young professionals to emigrate. Less than 40% of students who were about to enter the labour market perceived better economic and social future in their countries (Crush, 2005). The future prospect of job security and professional mobility in the region also seemed bleak. While the highest risk of brain drain was in countries that were not very strong economically, the more prosperous economies (Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) had a fairly good chance of losing much of their skills in future.

It is likely that brain circulation would increase in the region as this is a period of adjustment of intentions in every professional area. Migrants in destination countries may rationalize between staying and riding out the recession or returning home in the hope that improved economic prospects would offer good chances of employment through investment and training. Skilled unemployed migrants may be prepared to accept lower paying jobs as well as jobs that are not within their spheres of expertise when they return home. Investment in the private sector could be attractive to those who have acquired skills in areas which may accrue profit. In Nigeria, the movie industry (Nollywood) is growing because it is viable and attracting contribution from Nigerians abroad with production and acting skills (Chowhury et al. 2008). Though a couple of nations still have serious economic challenges, favourable political change in West and East Africa is attractive enough to encourage intentions of those in the new Diaspora to return. The usual sign of such intentions is willingness of nationals abroad to invest in the construction sector at home. Unfortunately, this new direction of development in Africa emphasizes skills and the maximization of it. Hence the unskilled will continue to be the most vulnerable to the effects of the global recession as the construction and tourism industries in the continent become more affected. It is plausible that, as the IOM (2009) predicted, the volume of irregular migration in and out of Africa would rise because the unskilled are the most likely to be unemployed, poor and to have large families depending on them. Urban poverty is likely to worsen as minerals such as copper lose their value and low productivity results in job cuts. However, though the general flow of international migration has weakened, it is unlikely that remittances will fall over a prolonged period.

Many African countries host a large number of refugees; but the number of refugees in Africa is declining. Among the political effects of globalization is the dramatic reduction in the number of

refugees in Africa. In January 2003 the continent had the second largest number of refugees in the world (after Asia). But there has been substantial decline in numbers since late 1989 when the Berlin Wall was pulled down. There were 2.49 million refugees in 2007, down from 2.60 million in 2006, 3.02 in 2005, and 3.58 in 2000. Therefore, refugees are contributing increasingly less to international migration in Africa. For example, as a percentage of the international migrants in Africa, refugees declined from 21.7% in 2000 to 17.7% in 2005. These declining trends result directly from reduced conflicts in the continent, particularly in Mozambique, Angola, and DRC. Peace and conflict settlement in Mozambique, for example, resulted in return from Malawi of about one million Mozambique refugees. Presently Malawi host few refugees and asylum seekers from Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. Strategies for attaining and maintaining world peace have improved since the end of the cold war. Africa governments have played increasingly significant roles in this regard. The establishment of ECOMOG by the Nigerian government and its role in attaining amicable conclusion to civil conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone is commendable. The African Union and other unions, such as SADC, as well as individual countries have mediated successfully to attain peace where there were violent conflict situations.

Generally, irregular migration is high in the West and Southern Africa and it is this category of migrant which suffer most from human rights violation. It is essential to recognize that irregular migrants are not only forced by economic circumstances to emigrate, but they take greater financial, health and psychological risks than their skilled counterparts. For example, the Maghreb route to the EU is much more complex, financially costly and physically more hazardous than it is in Southern Africa. It could take weeks or even months and years, depending on the route, to reach Europe through the Maghreb and there are several obstacles (climate, human, terrain and animals) to overcome because the full journey is made in step-wise movements (Icduygu and Unalau, 2001). Usually, the illegal migrants are men within the ages of 15 and 40 years. But increasingly women are participating in desperate efforts to escape poverty in a region where youth unemployment is up to 70%. Murder and injury by armed robbers are also among the risks these migrants are exposed to especially for those who take the Sahara Desert route to the North African coast. The health status of migrants may deteriorate due to the very poor conditions of housing and transport while on transit to Spain or Italy. Those who smuggle irregular migrants from West Africa through the Sahara Desert and Mediterranean Sea do so as a business. They charge exorbitant fees especially because of the network of smugglers that the migrant has to go through before reaching the ultimate destination. Due to the high cost of air travel, most migrants prefer the road/sea route. But even here the cost is usually high too, especially for unskilled persons with limited resources. A reasonable estimate of the boat trip from Senegal to the Spanish coast is about US\$1,311 while the total expense on a journey from West Africa to the Canary Islands is over US\$4626 (Van Moppes, 2006).

A substantial proportion of skilled and semi-skilled Africans left to work in other African countries, especially South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. Many did so irregularly or entered South Africa with valid documents but stayed on after their resident or visitor permit expired. Most irregular migrants are employed in commercial agriculture, construction, restaurant, hotel and domestic industries as well as informal trade (Waller, 2006; Crush 1999). Africa has the least incidence of human trafficking in the world (with Asia having the highest). In the 1990s the average annual number of people trafficked in the continent was just 7% of the global number of persons trafficked (Orhant, 2009). Trafficked persons who originate in Ghana usually end up in Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Italy Belgium, Netherlands, Lebanon, Libya and the US. The destinations of those from Nigeria are Italy, Belgium and Netherlands. Those from Ethiopia are usually taken to the Middle East and Gulf States while those from Mali end up in Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Saudi

Arabia and Kuwait (Orhant, 2009). In Africa, a major destination of human trafficking is South Africa, with Malaysia being a major source of trafficked persons.

Attitude towards Immigrants

Although the social and cultural differences between migrants and their future hosts may be anticipated when migration decisions are made, they may seem insignificant given the anticipated net rewards of moving. However, it has become increasingly realized that potential migrants should seriously consider their ability to withstand hostile attitudes and behaviour of the people at the destination. A negative aspect of social change in Africa since 1990 is the increasing tendency of nationals toward xenophobic behaviour. Xenophobia is among the most disturbing factors international migrants are exposed to in Africa and elsewhere. It is not new in Africa as it dates back over several centuries. What is new is its increasing strength. The Creoles in Sierra Leone and Americo-Liberians in Liberia (both descendants of resettled freed slaves from the Caribbean, UK and US) considered people of other ethnic groups (the indigenes) with disdain (Akpan, 1973; Kandeh, 1992; Campbell, 2003b). Later (early 20th century), the Creoles who moved to Nigeria were to experience a somewhat similar treatment when they attempted to out-class the Nigerians who deserved top administrative and economic positions in the country (Dixon-Fyle, 1999). Since the 1960s when most African countries attained political independence, many documented and irregular migrant workers have had their civil and economic rights violated by nationals and governments of the countries of employment. A classic example of this is the mass expulsions of irregular migrants from several African countries between the 1960s and 1970s. In Ghana, the economic impact of xenophobia was highlighted in 1969 when the parliamentary Aliens Compliance Order forced hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants to leave the country. Fourteen years later, this drama was repeated when the Nigerian government decided to expel over one million irregular migrants from the country (Adepoju, 1984).

The 1990s witnessed increased intolerance for immigrants throughout Africa, especially in southern Africa. As nationals become more sensitive to the extent of poverty in most African countries, there are fears of a backlash from the spillover of migrants who are looking opportunities to escape poverty as this fosters unemployment and other social and economic difficulties in the receiving countries. For example, a major concern of Namibians is that immigration would culminate in over-populating the country (Frayne and Pendleton, 2003). Political exclusion has been applied as a strategy by social majorities to maximize candidates' chances of victory in elections. Examples of this are La Côte d'Ivoire and Zambia where the constitutions were amended in the late 1990s to require that both parents of a presidential candidate be nationals of the country in which the presidency was about to be contested (Whitaker, 2005). In Gabon, the strategy was different. The President has frequently exploited a growing attitude of patriotism and intolerance of non-citizens among its urban population by directing it at immigrants in the country (Gray, 1998). Among the most controversial political issues is the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994. It is estimated that about 800,000 people, mostly Tutsi, were killed in the carnage (Lemarchand, 1998). Certainly, the historical heritage of the Tutsi is an ethnic minority ruling a country with Hutu majority. The diaspora Tutsi always maintained that they were the traditional rulers of Rwanda, with a hint of divinity punctuating this claim, and the Hutu have fiercely refuted it (see Sigwalt, 1975; Nsanze, 2002). But unlike the Creole and Americo-Liberian, the Tutsi and Hutu have been victims and aggressors of ethnic conflict on various occasions during the past Century. A general intolerance of irregular migrants in Southern Africa is not unique to the region. It reflects the perception of people who believe that irregular migration contravenes laws that dictate the process of international migration.

Consequences of Xenophobia

The effects of the Second World War on the population of Germany inform that where xenophobia was used as a weapon to address group conflict, the long term effects are generally negative. In the case of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda the effects were also catastrophic. In the first two countries the inherent emotional conflict between the settlers and indigenes erupted over a century later in violent and bloody ethnic wars (Abraham, 2001). In Liberia the seeds of revenge were sown when, in 1979, what began as a peaceful demonstration by the newly formed opposition parties against inflation of rice prices deteriorated into violent mob actions which almost totally destroyed the commercial infrastructure in Monrovia, the capital city (Jones, 2004). This was a spontaneous response by the indigene-backed opposition when the settler-backed elite police force fired live bullets at the crowds, causing a many fatalities. A bloody coup d'état followed in April 1980 and subsequent events culminated in Charles Taylor's invasion of the country in 1989, marking the start of one of the most vicious conflicts in contemporary West Africa.

Boas (2001) aptly points to the xenophobic divide created by neo-patrimonial politics as a common determinant of the wars which raged on throughout the 1990s. Similarly, Whitaker (2005: 111) warns that xenophobia "plants the seed for future political conflict and possibly even war". Xenophobia also has the potential to affect national economies negatively. The Haitian economy suffered partly because Haiti's Constitution was designed to prohibit whites, especially the French, from owning land and becoming citizens of the country (Lacerte, 1981). The seizure of white farms in Zimbabwe and its catastrophic effects on the national economy is reminiscent of the confiscation of large plantations in Haiti in the early 19th Century by the mulattoes who were encouraged to do so by the Constitution. This and several other policies which discriminated against whites forced American and European governments to abandon trade with Haiti especially as economic policies in other Latin American countries were quite favourable (Lacerte, 1981). The expulsion of illegal immigrants in Ghana and Nigeria did not help the human rights and economic image of these countries. The declining Ghanaian economy reached a critical stage in 1975 when inflation rose by over 100 percent within a few months as basic imported commodities vanished from the market, forcing many to revert to traditional methods of survival. By 1977 per capita consumption and daily calorie intake had declined significantly from what it was seventeen years earlier (Price, 1984). By the end of the decade emigration of skilled labour from the country reached alarming proportions, giving strength to the concept "brain drain" as many young and not so young professionals left for greener pastures in Nigeria, Europe and America. The entrance of Jerry Rawlings into Ghana's political arena by a coup d'état in 1979 (and again in 1981) has contributed to remarkable economic and infrastructural improvements in the country since 1985 with the assistance from the World Bank.

Though the economic decline in Nigeria was not the same as Ghana's, it also reached dramatic proportions with rising unemployment among professionals. The international value of the national currency (Naira), which was highly over-rated at US\$1.5 in 1985 fell rapidly between 1986 and 1990. Presently one US dollar is equivalent to 128 Naira and according to PRB (2006), ninety-two percent of the total population lives on less than two US dollars a day (the corresponding figure for Ghana is 79%). By 1990 an exodus of highly skilled professionals were already leaving Nigeria for Europe, US and southern Africa. Xenophobia and low performance of nationals are among the factors militating against foreign direct investment in Botswana (Modise, 2006).

Policy Considerations

Apart from financial needs and good governance, successful implementation of population development policies, including rural and urban development and poverty, require very good statistical data on population dynamics. However, since the 1970s, concerns over maternal and child health, gender equality and poverty in Africa have shifted research funds away from migration and urbanization. Research is a basic requirement of policy needs and should be done with the aim of maximizing data quality. But personal economic desires have influenced major diversion of funds to non-essential areas. Moreover, as the economies of African countries strained, there have been a tendency for researchers to shift toward consultancy. This has encouraged a proliferation of demand for consultants, to the demise of academic research. Consultancy may be associated with quick, simple and unreliable data base. The results seldom provide the detail needed to successfully implement population policies. Findlay and Gould (1989), among others have called attention to the need for increased research in migration-related issues; but it is not until recently that there seems to have been positive response. Research in poverty reduction in Africa has been hampered by several factors, including conceptual definition. Without universal agreement of what constitutes poverty, there will remain no clear understanding of the population that needs the most assistance.

In his classical article, Byerlee (1974) called attention to the importance of migration to economic and social development and the need for in-depth research into the subject. The article clearly informs about the role of migration as a means of redistributing human capital and income, transferring investment capital and attaining gender equality. It also emphasizes the importance of such research in the development of theories that would guide the formation and successful implementation of economic and social policies. Methodological improvement is also addressed; and with several examples from Africa, there is quite some relevance to African migration and development. Though the article received global acclaim for its contribution to scholarship, the main thrust of its message was practically ignored as social science researchers shifted attention to fertility and infant/child mortality studies. This was a strong and positive response to the dramatic shift of interest by funding organizations towards issues related to reproductive health. While the results demonstrate that the move was justified, particularly in Africa, it has left in its wake a huge gap in knowledge about the role of human capital in global economic development. Paradoxically, a major objective of family planning studies in the 1970s was the maximization of human capital in developing countries.

A major policy action for stemming rural-urban migration and attaining efficiency of urban populations in Africa is to improve the implementation of rural development programmes, where they have not been satisfactory. The persistence of disequilibrium between rural and urban incomes is partly due to high levels of urban unemployment which, through restrictive urban-rural remittances, prolong the period of attaining equilibrium between the two areas. Beside other important factors, such as SAP and poor management systems, urban inefficiency in many African countries is due to the transfer of labour with skills that may not be required to maximize production in urban areas. But maximizing production in modern societies requires that labour (migrant and non-migrant work within an environment that inspires commitment to modern standards of living, including becoming modern. In this regard, universal primary education may not be a sufficient policy to adopt.

The majority of African states are concerned about brain drain and its impacts on development. In response to the ECA survey, most countries consider the migration of talented and skilled Africans to Europe, USA and Australia as scarce human resources drain. Actions taken include

improvements in the general working conditions of health workers and localization policies which regulate employment of foreign professionals in the country. In Botswana and Malawi, examples of countries in which these actions have been taken, the number of professionals in the health sector migrating abroad has considerably reduced. Some governments provide good lessons of experience for addressing the issue of irregular migration. Tanzania, for example, is addressing this type of migration through strategies that provide relevant information on the related risks, and building capacities in the area of migration management. Ethiopia has taken similar actions which have led to decline in irregular migration. The government is letting people realize the dangers of irregular migration; and this has contributed to a decline in the volume of irregular movements in the country. Similarly, in Somalia, where operational institutions are weak, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and other international organizations are providing such services and building the capacity of local authorities to address these concerns.

Among the factors that determine the attainment of good living standards are good health and education, gender equality, intergenerational wealth flows and non-poverty. Some of the greatest challenges to healthy populations in the regions are the HIV and AIDS pandemic, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria. While individual standards may vary, the goal should be the attainment of socioeconomic levels where everyone lives above the poverty level. Primary among the millennium development goals (MDG) is the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger and the attainment of this goal requires the successful implementation of development policies that would ensure that at least the first six MDGs were met (i.e. eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health and combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases). Achieving these goals require an efficient economic system through regional economic and social integration. Equally important is the need to harmonize the conceptualization of poverty and gender, especially in the World Bank. For example, terms such as structurally poor, absolutely poor, extremely poor, and chronically poor have been used to express the same thing. As Whitehead and Lockwood (1999) observed, the multiplicity of definitions in these subjects is largely responsible for the stifling of policies on gendered poverty in Africa. Within the framework of social integration, migration provides a just response to the economic integration process, which is why countries such as South Africa and Botswana resisted the formulation and implementation of the ECOWAS-style 'free movement of persons...' Human movements have the potential to redistribute wealth between rich and poor countries through remittances to the extent that real income differences between the two types of states are eventually minimized (Sjaastad, 1962). Social integration will assist this process because it nullifies all restrictions to the free flow of human resource and economic transactions between states, between communities and between families (Nye, 1968). Unfortunately, the implementation of regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa is still in its infancy.

In Central Africa some of the major constraints to the achievement of international migration goals include administration weaknesses, household poverty, the bright lights effects on emigration, political instability and its effects on keeping the borders porous with common ethnic groups straddling the borders. These increase the difficulty of policing the international borders. In East and Southern Africa the major challenges include the persistence of food insecurity. This is particularly the case in Lesotho even though men do not migrate to South African mines as they used to do before South Africa's policy change on recruitment of foreign mine workers. Hence, return migration of men has not being particularly advantageous to agricultural production as was perceived at the peak of labour migration to the mines in South Africa. Among the incentives for the return is the creation of good working conditions in Lesotho. The

challenges include scant data and unreliable data on international migration as well as non-cooperation between ministries.

Conclusion

Part of the reasons migration (internal and international) has become problematic in the 21st Century is the exclusion of the subject from the core areas of demographic research. It was even assumed to have no significant impact on the development of national populations. But with the advent of globalization, it has increasingly become quite prominent as governments began to acknowledge the human and economic issues (especially positive ones) that are associated with international migration and national development. It has become clear that development is not an alternative to migration. It is also quite clear that that development does not, as previously assumed, suppress out-migration (within countries) and emigration. Instead it accelerates them (Campbell, 1988; De Wenden, 2009). With developments that accompanied events in 1989, internal and international migrations have increased considerably. The increased generation of income has led to astronomical rise on the flow of wealth from migrants to families and their personal accounts in developing countries. Though Africa receives only a small fraction of all remittances to developing countries, there are indications that these cash flows have been of substantial assistance to families at home who may have been poorer without them. The level of government interest in international migration has grown. While this is very encouraging, there is need for governments to strengthen their commitment to migration issues especially given what are now known about the effects of ‘unexpected’ economic recessions on the employment status of global populations. From available data, only 5% of governments in Africa are fully committed to the migration policy framework of the continent. Another 20% are divided equally between ‘some’ and ‘most’ commitments. Efforts should be made to raise these levels to those which helped control the spread and incidence of HIV/AIDS and improve reproductive health in the continent.

The main factors that inform current and future states of capital cities are (a) its foundation and evolution and (b) economic and social development. Geography has influenced perceptions about urbanization to the extent that the position of a capital city, versus other cities and towns, has been frequently assessed within the framework of rank-size and central place theories (Ishikawa and Toda, 2000). It is essential that governments endeavour to utilize human and other resources in African cities with the objective of maximizing profit. Successful implementation of income maximizing investments should be done taking into consideration the many factors that are involved in urban development. The economists’ preferences for matters related to economic sustainability of societies tend to assume that economic factors alone explain population concentration. Meanwhile, several other factors, including politics and history also make significant contributions to population concentration in the city. Studies in these areas are needed in order to obtain lasting solution to urban growth problems in Africa. Migration-induced land rent hike may be imposed to help control cityward migration and population size in the city (Brueckner and Kim, 2001). Alleviating poverty in Africa may remain elusive for quite a while because it is sustained by several factors, some of which are rooted in traditional African culture. It would require personal determination by individuals as well as commitment to the MDGs by governments to alleviate poverty. However, extreme poverty may be reduced significantly through political commitment to decentralized investment policies, including integrated rural development, research-led agricultural reforms and economic diversification. At the micro-economic level, migrant remittances will continue to be an asset to receiving families who would otherwise be poor. The potential of remittances to foster income inequality should not be

perceived negatively because remittances merely reflect economic reward for family investment in migrants. However, it is essential for governments to be committed to poverty alleviation by implementing good economic policies and by practicing good governance and taking measures to eradicate all kinds of corruption.

References

- Adepoju, A. (1984) Illegals and expulsion in Africa: Nigerian experience, *International Migration Review*, 18(8): 426-436.
- Adepoju, A. (2006) Leading issues in international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Cross, C. et al. (eds.) *Views on Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa*, pp. 25-47, Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Adepoju, A. (2008) Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, *Current African Issues* No. 37. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet.
- Akpan, M.B. (1973) Black imperialism: Americo-Liberian rule over the African peoples of Liberia, *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 7(2): 217-236.
- Anarfi, J.K. & Antwi, P. (1995) Street youth in Accra city: Sexual networking in a high-risk environment and its implications for the spread of HIV/AIDS, *Health Transition Review*, Suppl. to Volume 5, 131-151.
- Andvig, J. & Fjeldstad, O. (2001) *Corruption: A Review of Contemporary Research*. Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.
- Barrett, C.B., Carter, M.R. and Little, P.D. (2006) Understanding and reducing persistent poverty in Africa: Introduction to a special issue, *Journal of Development Studies*, 42(2): 167-177.
- Beauchemin, C. & Schoumaker, B. (2005) Migration to cities in Burkina Faso: Does the level of development in sending areas matter? *World Development*, 33(7): 1129-1152.
- Becker, C.M. & Morrison, A.R. (1988) The determinants of urban population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 36(2): 259-278.
- Bloom, D.E. & Sachs, J.D. (1998) Geography, demography and economic growth in Africa. In W.C. Brainard and G.L. Perry (Eds.) *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, pp. 207-274, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute.
- Botswana (1994) Census 1991, Employment Indicators. *Stats Brief* No.94/2. Gaborone: Central Statistics Office.
- Botswana (2009) *2006 Botswana Demographic Survey*, Gaborone: Central Statistics Office.
- Brockhoff, M. (1995) Fertility and family planning in African cities: The impact of female migration, *Journal of Biosocial Science*, 27(3): 347-358.
- Brueckner, J.K. & Kim, H. (2001) Land markets in the Harris-Todaro model: A new factor equilibrating rural-urban migration, *Journal of Regional Science*, 41(3): 507-520.
- Buve, A, Bishikwabo-Nsarhaza, K. & Mutangadura, G. (2002) The spread and effect of HIV-1 infection in Sub-Saharan Africa, *The Lancet*, 359: 2011-2017.
- Byerlee, D. (1974) Rural-urban migration in Africa: Theory, policy and research implications, *International Migration Review*, 8(4): 543-566.
- Byerlee, D., Tommy, J.L. & Fatoo, H. (1976) Rural-urban migration in Sierra Leone – determinants and policy implications, *African Rural Economic Papers*, No.13, Michigan State University.
- CMS (2010) *Fastest Growing Cities and Urban Areas* (1-100), CityMayors Statistics. London.
- Caldwell, J.C. (1978) A theory of fertility: From high plateau to destabilization, *Population and Development Review*, 4(1), 553-577.
- Caldwell, J.C. & Caldwell, P. (1987) The cultural context of high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa, *Population and Development Review*, 13(3): 409-437.

- Caldwell, J.C. & Caldwell, P. (1990) High fertility in Sub Saharan Africa, *Scientific American*, 262(5): 118-125.
- Caldwell, J.C., Orubuloye, I.O. & Caldwell, P. (1992) Fertility Decline in Africa: A New Type of Transition? *Population and Development Review*, 18(2): 211-242.
- Campbell, E.K. (1988) Rural-urban migration and rural development interrelations in West Africa: Some obstacles to goal achievement, *African Urban Quarterly*, 3(1&2), 34-49.
- Campbell, E.K. (1993) Family size preferences of men in the Western Area of Sierra Leone: Methods and determinants, *Genus*, 1L(1-2), 181-199.
- Campbell, E.K. (1998) Population distribution and urbanization, in W. Edge and M. Lekorwe (eds.), *Botswana: Politics and Society*, Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik Publishers, 261-280.
- Campbell, E.K. (2003a) A Note on Alcohol Consumption and Sexual behaviour of Youths in Botswana, *African Sociological Review*, 7(1): 146-161.
- Campbell, E.K. (2003b) Attitudes of Botswana citizens towards immigrants: Signs of xenophobia? *International Migration*, 41(4): 71-111.
- Census Bureau (2008) *Census Dates for Countries and Areas of Africa: 1945 to 2014*. US Census Bureau, Washington, D.C.
- Chant S. 2007. Poverty begins at home? Questioning some (mis)conceptions about children, poverty and privation in female-headed households. UNICEF Report on State of the World's Children 2007. London School of Economics.
- Chowhury, M., Landes, T., Santini, M., Tejada, L., and Visconti, G. (2008) Nollywood: The Nigeria Film Industry, Harvard Business School, Harvard University.
- Christiaensen, L., Demery, L. & Paternostro, S. (2003) Macro and micro perspectives of growth and poverty in Africa, *The World Bank Economic Review*, 17(3): 317-347.
- Cliggett L. (2005) Remitting the gift: Zambian mobility and anthropological insights for migration studies. *Population, Space and Place* 11: 35-48.
- Collier, P. & Gunning, J.W. (1999) Why has Africa grown slowly? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 13(3): 3-22.
- Crowder, M. (1987) Whose dream was it anyway? Twenty-five years of African independence, *African Affairs*, 86(342): 7-24.
- Crush J (1999) The discourse and dimensions of irregularity in post-apartheid South Africa, *International Migration*, 37(1): 125-151.
- Crush, J. (Ed.), (2005) *States of Vulnerability: The Brain Drain of Future Talent to South Africa*, Migration Policy Series No. 42, Southern African Migration Project: Cape Town.
- Crush, J., Pendleton, W. & Tevera, D. (2005) *Degrees of Uncertainty: Students and the Brain Drain in Southern Africa*. Southern African Migration Policy Series, No.35, Idasa: Cape Town.
- Csapo, M. (1983) Universal primary education in Nigeria: its problems and implications, *African Studies Review*, 26(1): 91-106.
- De Wenden, C.W. (2009) Co-development policies in Europe: Objectives, experiences and limits, paper presented at the Conference on African Transnational and Return Migration in the Context of North-South Relations, Warwick University, Coventry, June 29-30, 2009.
- Deininger, K., & Squire, L. (1996) A new data set measuring income inequality, *The World Bank Economic Review*, 10(3): 565-591.

- Dixon-Fyle, M. 1999. *A Saro Community in the Niger Delta, 1912-1984: The Potts-Johnson of Port Harcourt and Their Heirs*, University of Rochester Press: New York.
- Dow, T.E., Archer, L., Khasiani, S. & Kekovole, J. (1994) Wealth flow and fertility decline in rural Kenya 1981-1992, *Population and Development Review*, 20(2): 343-364.
- Drimie, S. (2003) HIV/Aids and land: Case studies from Kenya, Lesotho and South Africa, *Development Southern Africa*, 20(5): 647-658.
- Ewing, G.O. (1974) Gravity and linear regression models of spatial interaction: A cautionary note, *Economic Geography*, 54(3): 254-273.
- Findlay, A. and Gould, W.T.S. (1989) Skilled international migration: A research Agenda, *Area*, 21(1): 3-11.
- Fosu, A.K. (1992) Political instability and economic growth: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 40(4): 829-841.
- Frayne B & Pendleton W (2003) *Mobile Namibia: Migration Trends and Attitudes*. Migration Policy Series No.27, Southern African Migration Project: Cape Town.
- Griffiths, S. (2005) Smalltime savers, bigtime capital, *AiAfrica-Investor*, 1 April.
- Gwebu, T.D. (1987) Internal Migration and Regional Development in Botswana. In Adepoju, A. (Ed.) *Internal Migration and Regional Development in Africa*, pp. 169-204, Accra: Regional Institute for Population Studies.
- Gwebu, T.D. (2006) Towards a theoretical exploration of the differential urbanisation model in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Botswana case, *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 97(4): 418-433.
- Henry, S, Boyle, P. & Lambin, E.F. (2003) Modelling inter-provincial migration in Burkina Faso, West Africa: the role of socio-demographic and environmental factors, *Applied Geography*, 23(2-3): 115-136.
- IOM (2009) The impact of the global financial crisis, *IOM Policy Brief*, January, International Organization for Migration, Geneva.
- Icduygu, A. & Unalan, T. (2001) Tides Between Mediterranean Shores: Undocumented migration in the south of Europe, Conference Paper, 10SSP General Population conference XXIV, Brazil: Session S26.
- Ishikawa, T. & Toda, M. (2000) Some economic extensions of central-place theory involving profit maximization, *Urban Studies*, 37(3): 481-495.
- Johnson, O.E.G. (2004) How will good economic policy environments emerge in Africa? *Policy Reform*, 7(3): 151-164.
- Joseph, R.A. (1978) Affluence and underdevelopment: the Nigerian experience, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 16(2): 221-239.
- Kalichman, S.C., Simbayi, L.C., Kagee, A., Toefy, Y., Jooste, S., Cain, D. & Cherry, C. (2006) Associations of poverty, substance use, and HIV transmission risk behaviors in three South African communities, *Social Science and Medicine*, 62(7): 1641-1649.
- Kandeh JD (1992) Politicization of ethnic identities in Sierra Leone, *African Studies Review*, 35(1): 81-99.
- Kayizzi-Mugerwa, S. (2003) Globalization, growth and uincome inequality: The African experience. In R. Kohl (ed.) *Globalization, Poverty and Inequality*, pp.45-52. Paris: OECD Publications.
- Keiser, J., Utzinger, J., De Castro, M.C., Smith, T.A., Tanner, M. & Singer, B.H. (2004) Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa and implications for malaria control, *American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, 71(Suppl 2) 118-127.

- Kes, A. & Swaminathan, H. (2006) Gender and time poverty in Sub Saharan Africa. In Blackden, C.M. & Wodon, Q. (Eds.) *Gender, Time Use and Poverty in Sub Saharan Africa*, pp.13-38, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Kirk, D. & Pillet, B. (1998) Fertility levels, trends, and differentials in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, *Studies in Family Planning*, 29(1): 1-22.
- Krantz, L. (2001) The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach to Poverty Reduction: An Introduction. Swedish International Development Corporation Agency, Division for Policy and Socio-Economic Analysis, SIDA: Stockholm.
- Lacerte, R.K. (1981) Xenophobia and economic decline: The Haitian case, 1820-1843, *The Americas*, 37(4): 499-515.
- Lampman, R.J. (1965) Approaches to the reduction of poverty, *The American Economic Review*, 55 (1/2): 521-529.
- Lee, E.S. (1966) A theory of migration, *Demography*, 3: 47-59.
- Lugalla, J.L.P. (1997) Development, change and poverty in the informal sector during the era of structural adjustments in Tanzania, *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 31(3): 424-451.
- Malthus, T.R. (1970) *An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798)*. Edited by Anthony Flew. Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc.
- Mattes, R., Bratton, M. & Davids, Y.B. (2003) Poverty, survival and democracy in southern Africa. *Afrobarometer* No. 23. Idasa: Cape Town.
- Mbaku, J.M. (1988) Political instability and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some recent evidence, *The Review of Black Political Economy*, 17(1): 89-112.
- Medeiros M, Costa JS. 2006. Poverty among women in Latin America: feminization or overrepresentation? Working Paper No.0020. International Poverty center:Brasilia.
- Modise, O. (2006) Foreign investors jittery, *Sunday Standard*, February 4, 1.
- Mwabu, G. & Thorbecke, E. (2004) Rural development, growth and poverty in Africa, *Journal of African Economies*, 13, Suppl. 1, i16-i65.
- Njoh, A.J. (2003) Urbanization and development in Sub-Saharan Africa, *Cities*, 20(3): 167-174.
- Nye, J.S (1968) Comparative regional integration: Concept and measurement, *International Organization*, 22(4): 855-880.
- Oucho, J.O. (1997) Recent internal migration processes in Sub-Saharan Africa: Determinants, consequences, and data adequacy issues. In R.E. Bilborrow (Ed.) *Migration, Urbanization, and Development: New Directions and Issues*, pp. 89-120, New York: UNFPA & Kluwer Academic Press.
- Peberdy, S. & Dinat, N. (2005) *Migration and Domestic Workers: Worlds of Work, Health and Mobility in Johannesburg*. Southern African Migration Policy Series, No.40, Idasa: Cape Town.
- Prothero, R.M. (1994) Forced movements of population and health hazards in tropical Africa, *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 23(4): 657-664.
- Quisumbing AR, Haddad L, Pena C. 2001. Are women overrepresented among the poor? An analysis of poverty in ten developing countries. Discussion Paper No.115. Food Consumption and Nutrition Division, International Food Policy Research Institute: Washington, D.C.
- Rakodi, C. (1997) Global forces, urban change, and urban management in Africa. In Rakodi, C. (ed.) *The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Ravenstein, E.G. (1889) The laws of migration, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 52: 241-301.
- Robert, V., Macintyre, K., Keaton, J., Trape, J., Duchemin, J., Warren, M. & Beier, J. (2003) Malaria transmission in urban Sub-Saharan Africa, *American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, 68(2): 169-176.
- Sako, S. (2002) Brain drain and Africa's development: A reflection, *African Issues*, 30(1): 25-30.

- Salau, A.T. (1988) National development and regional planning in West Africa, *Regional Development Dialogue*, Special Issue, 89-113.
- Saxenian, A. (2005) From Brain drain to brain circulation: Transnational communities and regional upgrading in India and China, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 40(2): 35-51.
- Sechaba Consultants and Associates (2002) *The Border Within: The Future of the Lesotho-South African international Boundary*, J. Crush (ed.), Migration Policy Series No.26, Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project.
- Seers, D. (1972) What are we trying to measure? *Journal of Development Studies*, 8(3): 21-36.
- Sjaastad, L.A (1962) The costs and returns of human migration, *Journal of Political Economy*, 70(5): 80-93.
- Taylor, J.E. (1999) The new economics of labour migration and the role of remittances in the migration process. *International Migration* 37: 63–86.
- Tevera, D. & Zinyama, L. (2002) *Zimbabweans Who Move: Perspectives on International Migration in Zimbabwe*, J. Crush (ed.), Migration Policy Series No.25, Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project.
- Thirtle, C., Lin, L. & Piesse, J. (2003) The impact of research-led agricultural productivity growth on poverty reduction in Africa, Asia and Latin America, *World Development*, 31(12): 1959-1975.
- Todaro, M.P. (1969) A model of labour migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries, *American Economic Review*, 59: 138-148.
- Trager, L. (1987) A re-examination of the urban informal sector in West Africa, *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 21(2): 238-255.
- Trape, J.F. & Zoulani, D.A. (1987) Malaria and urbanization in Central Africa: the example of Brazzaville. Part II: Results of entomological surveys and epidemiological analysis, *Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, 8(1): Supp.2, 10-18.
- Truong, T.D. (2008) Governance and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa: Rethinking best practice in migration management, *International Social Science Journal*, 58(190): 697-714.
- UN/AU (2009) The global financial crisis: impact, responses and way forward. Presented at the Joint Annual Meetings of the AU Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance and ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Cairo, Egypt, 2-5 June, 2009.
- UNFPA (2007) State of World Population 2007: Unleashing the Potential of Urban Growth. United Nations Population Fund, New York: United Nations.
- United Nations (2005) *Demographic Yearbook*, Table 6. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations (2009) *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations (2010a) *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision*, Figure 2. Population Division, New York: United Nations.
- United Nations (2010b) *Social Indicators*. New York: United Nations.
- Van der Post, C. (1995) Internal Migration. *1991 Population and Housing Census Dissemination Seminar*, pp. 83-94, Gaborone: Central Statistics Office.
- Van Dijk, R. (2003) Localisation, Ghanaian pentecostalism and the stranger's beauty in Botswana, *Africa*, 73(4): 560-583.
- Van Moppes, D (2006) *The African Migration Movement: Routes to Europe*, Working Paper, Migration and Development Series, Radhond University, Nijmegen (The Netherlands).
- Waller, L. (2006) *Irregular Migration to South Africa During the First Ten Years of Democracy*, J. Crush (ed.), Migration Policy Series No.19: Southern African Migration Project, Cape Town.

Whitehead, A. & Lockwood, M. (1999) Gendering poverty: A review of six World Bank african poverty assessment, *Development and Change*, 30: 525-555.

Zlotnick, H. (1995) The south to north migration of women, *International Migration Review*, 29(1): 229-254.

Zlotnick, H. (2009) The global dimension of female migration, *Migration Information Source*, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.