

**Youth Migration, Urbanization and Development of Informal
Employment in Africa**

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Introduction

Youth migration, as a social phenomenon arising from the effort to access formal education and skill development opportunities that are available in urban centers, has recently become a force for determining effective economic policy in Africa, by highlighting the significance of the informal sector. This is the subject matter of the present paper, which is expanded upon, as we describe the process of youth migration in the increasing urbanization in Africa and in the development of informal employment in the continent.

The socio-political development of urbanization in Africa has given rise to the growth of youth migration as a phenomenon, attracted initially by the desire for formal secondary and tertiary education, but lately by the search for economic emancipation and empowerment. Among the causes of youth migration is the spatial disparity in social, economic and political opportunities, created by the government, which is often urban-biased. This heightens expectations of youths, among other categories of the populace as to the urban center being the best place their needs could be met. Consequently, their movement is urban-wards.

However, the economic circumstances accompanying modern urbanization in Africa are not conducive to meeting the aspirations of the youth. This occurs as youth migration adds to the already teeming urban population and compounds the demand for urban socio-economic supplies, among others. The shortfall in urban socio-economic provisions, coupled with the ill-equipped youth migrants for even the few formal employment that the urban centers could offer, leads to a change in the youth migrants' socio-economic attitude. This manifests in form of the young migrants seeking alternate means towards achieving a livelihood in the urban center. This is a factor in the development of the informal sector of the urban economy.

Then again, the new factor of the social attitudes for youth to abandon the search for educational empowerment for materialistic emancipation through the cash nexus is evolving the necessity to develop the informal sector of the economy to be an important economic policy thrust in Africa. This presents an important shift of the policy making in Africa that is worth investigating. In essence, the focus of the present paper is on youth migration, in relation to the other two processes, of urbanization and the development of informal employment, as it impacts development.

Accordingly, the subject matter of the paper is examined in three main sections. Section one is on youth migration and urbanization, with its sub-sections that deal with youth population size and growth and urbanization in Africa, with reference to their indications for migration, in particular youth migration. The second section is on youth migrants in urban centers and development of informal employment in Africa. The sub-sections of this part are the evolving employment in informal sector in Africa and case studies of youth in informal sector, in particular the few studies on young migrants in some African countries. The third section analyses youth program in some of the countries on their skill acquisition and employment. The conclusion is on the need for an effective, multi-dimensional economic package for resolving problems of youth migration that is spurred on by increasing urbanization in Africa.

Youth Migration in the Socio-economic Development of Urbanization in Africa

Although youth migration is not a new phenomenon in Africa, the increasing scale of its occurrence has spurred on an awareness of its importance in urbanization of recent. Earlier writings have made mentions of youth migration in passing, in connection with minors that accompanied their parents or guardians as they grow up, and or in terms of youth on the move for their academic pursuit or skill development, and or as house-helpers and apprentices in urban centers, where they are hired or are enrolled from other localities, usually rural centers. They were not necessarily focused on in urbanization studies. Rather, they featured much more in write-ups on rural-rural migration, as laborers on farms, fishing, and quarries sites and as artisan workers.

Recent write-ups on youth migration and urbanization are those that featured them as drop-out and or as those that had finished schooling at the three tiers of education (primary, secondary and tertiary levels) and were adding to the rapid urbanization in many African cities. This was because such centers were perceived as locations of white-collar jobs, skill acquisitions and or educational advancement. Even then, the write-ups did not single out young migrants as a group of significance in the urbanization process. Therefore, inferences can only be made on them from the available data at global and regional levels.

An example is the characteristics that UNDP (2007) give on young people's lack of motivation to engage in independent farming activities, as follows:

- A perception of agriculture as back-breaking labour that fails to yield adequate returns.
- Therefore, the continuous exodus of young people from rural to urban areas, which suggests that the rural areas are unattractive to the young.
- Hence, their search for better employment opportunities and higher incomes.
- Their excitement and novelty of 'bright lights'.
- Possibility of their accessing better education, health services, modern sanitation, electricity, entertainment and paved roads in urban centers.
- Aspirations of youth that are not matched by deteriorating living conditions in rural areas, and
- The belief of limited opportunities in rural areas.

Youth Population Size, Growth and Urbanization in Africa

Data on youth population size, growth and growth are examined as proxy for youth migration in relation to urbanization trend in Africa. Africa is reported as the youngest continent that has about one-fifth (20.5%) of its total population between 15-24 years old in 2005. Also, its high population growth rate, of 2.4 per cent, intensifies the already high absolute number of young people, of 197,469,000 in 2007, as on Tables 1a and 1b. The result would therefore be as the UN, World Population Prospects (2008), for example, puts it:

Youth continue to make up approximately one-fifth of the total population in many developing regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa (20.3 per cent) and North Africa (20.0 per cent). Between 2010 and 2015 the number of youth living in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to increase by 19.4 million, which translates to an increase in the share of Sub-Saharan Africa in the global youth population from 14 to 15 per cent.

In addition, Population Reference Bureau (2009) comments on likely areas of relationship of increase in the youth population of Africa, in particular urbanization, as:

The world's youth population, ages 15-24 will be more and more concentrated in Africa and Asia. By 2050, the number of youth will have risen from just under a half billion in 1950 to 1.2 billion. At that point, about nine in 10 youths will be in developing countries. This very large group will arrive at working age with a right to expect gainful employment, adequate health care, and the ability to raise a family with an appropriate living standard if they so choose. ... Most likely, tomorrow's youth will have moved to cities in larger numbers as opportunities in the rural areas diminish.

As well, literacy level of the youth predisposes them to moving urban-ward. In many African countries, access to primary education has improved considerably and increasing proportion of the youth is acquiring secondary and tertiary education. UNESCO (2006) gives the gross enrolment ratio in secondary education in sub-Saharan Africa as 25 per cent in 2000 increasing to 32 per cent in 2005. The tertiary gross enrolment ratio was just picking up, with 5 per cent for the same year. However, North Africa has made considerable progress with higher enrolment in secondary and tertiary education, of 68 and 22 per cent in 2005 respectively. Other literacy features, such as gender disparity, which is wider at the later two levels of education than at the primary school level and courses offered at the tertiary

educational level are indicators of likely groups of youth in the urban migration stream. Table 2a and 2b capture some of the youth literacy features in many African countries.

Increased youth population can be an asset, if well harnessed. It is believed that the sheer numbers and vulnerability of the youth in sub-Saharan Africa, if gainfully employed, could result into 12 to 19 per cent gain in GDP (ILO, 2004). Also, while recognizing Africa's demographic challenges, the World Bank Report (2008/2009) and PRB (2009) see the large youth population as an opportunity, as the former puts it:

The demographic transition makes youth the most abundant asset that the region may claim; thus, making it a window of opportunity.

On the other hand, the demographic characteristics of the youth feature present challenges, the greatest of which is the continent's inability to provide sufficient educational requirements and gainful job for the rapidly growing youth population. Also, the large proportions of youth that are out of school and with qualifications that do not meet the specification of likely employers in the formal sector are indicators of larger numbers of youth who are not gainfully employed. Increase in youth migration into urban centres with the expectation of getting absorbed by the formal sector would, therefore, be insecure.

Current information available shows that problems have been brewing because of the differences between the increasing number of youth migration and urban economic resources to match. Such problems include unemployment, under-employment, prostitution, and other belligerent behaviours. Unfortunately, evidence of the contribution of youth migration per se has not been readily available.

Migration and Urbanization in Africa

Not only does lack of data on demographic characteristics of young migrants pose a problem in appreciating the relationship between youth migration and urbanization, gauging the proportion due youth migration has not been attempted. Even if done, about the same problems are envisaged just like those of earlier analysis on migration. Yet, such analysis would be revealing on different aspects of development on youth migration.

Notwithstanding, urbanization in Africa has been increasing dramatically, with significant differences for Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and Southern Africa. The latter two blocs have about half of their population urban, while for sub-Saharan Africa, it has been close to two-fifths in the past twenty years. Thus, in 1950, the proportion urban in sub-Saharan Africa was under 15 per cent; by 1970 and 1985, it reached 23 and 31 per cent respectively. By 2005 and 2009, it was 34 and 35 per cent respectively (PBR, 2009).

The proportion that net migration contributes to urbanization has been high in many African urban centers, though fluctuating. The predominance of net migration in most of the cases is

because urban centers happen to be the most attractive locations in the African countries, as they are the main administrative, commercial and employment centers. Over the years, the spatial disparity has been heightened. Consequently, there has been an increasing agglomeration of people in places designated urban, in spite of the fact that close to two-thirds of Africa remains rural.

In addition, reclassification of settlements has contributed to the rapid rate of urbanization. This results from the addition of the population of formerly classified rural areas to those of the urban centers that they are merged with and the emergence of new ones. Indirectly too, the migration factor boosts equally the reclassification factor; hence, it enhances its importance in the rapid rate of urbanization.

In essence, Makannah (1990) gives data that support predominance of net migration in the annual rate of growth of urban population; quoting the author, for example:

Notable feature of the pattern of urban growth in sub-Saharan African countries is the disproportionate share of the bigger especially the primate cities in their growth. A summary of the results of an analysis on the growth of selected cities in sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 to 1985 indicates that, within the 1960s, their growth were very fast, with the average annual rates ranging from 4.6 to 10.3 per cent, that is, with doubling periods of between 7 to 14 years. Average rates of urban growth decreased within the period 1970 to 1985, varying from 4.3 to 6.5 per cent, that is, with doubling times of between 10 and 16 years.

Bocquier and Traoré (2000), as quoted in Beauchemin and Bocquier (2003), give the temporal dimension of the migration factor in urbanization, as:

...considering these results, the role of migration in urban growth seems to be less important than is commonly assumed: the process of urbanization, from a demographic point of view, is more complex than a simple rush of migrants from rural to urban areas.

Beauchemin and Bocquier (2003) buttress the high, though fluctuating, importance of the migration as an explanatory factor in the rapid rate of urbanization in some francophone countries, as:

...the contributions of migration and reclassification to urban growth appear to be decreasing. Indeed, according to the GEOPOLIS database, two-thirds of urban growth in West Africa was due to migration and reclassification in the 1960s, and only one-third in the 1990s. ...whatever the cause of the decreasing contribution of migration to the urbanization process, the influence of migrants on urban demographic dynamics is double: they contribute directly to urban growth through their arrival, but they also have an indirect role through their reproductive behaviors. Therefore, it seems that the indirect contribution of migration to the urban growth is not as straightforward as is commonly assumed.

As supportive evidences, Beauchemin and Bocquier (2003) give the following:

... The growth rate of Abidjan was +10.3% per year between 1965 and 1975. The NESMUWA results show that capital cities are still attractive at the early 1990s, but the rates

are not so spectacular. ... The annual migratory growth for the population aged 15 and over varies from 0.5% in Niamey, Niger and Dakar, Senegal to 3.1% in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, where international immigration is responsible for almost 40% of the growth. International immigration is responsible for three-quarters of the annual growth of 1.7% of Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.

However, none of the write-ups have analysed the contribution of youth migration to the rapid rate of urbanization. All that can be gathered thus far is the interwoven nature of the migration factor with the other two determinants of urbanization. Nonetheless, since immigration at its commencement is age selective, often of youth, 15-24 years old, the relationship between youth migration and urbanization can be deduced as being high. This is based on the fact that migration factor manifests in the natural increase factor in forms of an inter-play of births exceeding deaths of indigenes, stock of migrants and of new migrants. Consequently, the youthfulness of the urban population is augmented. Again, this is justifiable judging from the fact that the 15-24 years old comprises majority in the reproductive group. Altogether, the natural increase and net migration fuel the population growth rate of urban centers, leading to rapid urbanization.

In addition, the relationship can be expected to be more than unidirectional in nature, which is that not only does youth migration fuel urbanization, urbanization acts as a pull on youth. This is a situation that future research could address, among others.

Youth Migration and Development of Informal Employment in Africa

Youth Employment in African Urban Centres

The goal of the youth in moving to urban centres is to improve their livelihoods. Young people that have acquired skill and knowledge could be expected to look forward to finding a job. More often than not, job prospects for them are very bleak. Many write-ups have demonstrated that youth unemployment is on the increase in many African countries, as a result of rapid rate of population growth, migration, labor market dynamics and labor market opportunities. The economic viability of the African urban settings in the fulfilment of such dreams is, therefore, the issue. The adequacy of the urban economy in meeting the needs of youth migration is deduced from available data on the urban labour force, youth employment-to population ratio, youth unemployment rate or youth share of unemployment, and ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment rate, among others.

Economic development indicators show poor performance and deepening poverty for majority of Africans. The annual GDP growth rate for many years has not been commensurate with the population growth rate. About half of African population (49%) lives on less than \$1 a day (FAO, 2001). Tables 3a and 3b present the evidence of fluctuating low

annual GDP growth rates in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, in particular sub-Saharan Africa. In more-depth, Fosu (2010) describes the data in Table 3b for the six regions of the world and during the two sub-periods: 1981-95 and 1996-2005, as:

Sub-Saharan Africa rise in poverty in the earlier sub-period was associated with a decline in per capita GDP during that period. Conversely, the reduction in SSA's poverty since the mid-1990s has been accompanied by growth resurgence. Associated with a one percent mean annual per-capita GDP reduction in 1981-95 was a corresponding increase in poverty of 0.64 per cent and 0.27 per cent per annum, respectively, at the \$1.25 and \$2.50 poverty levels. For 1981-2005, an annual mean GDP growth of 1.29 per cent was translated to poverty reduction of 1.60 per cent and 0.52 per cent annually respectively.

There are also differences in the labour market status of young people in the two sub- regions of Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. Based on the data on Tables 4a to 4f for 1997, 2006 and 2007 on youth employment, youth unemployment and youth inactivity, three types of the labour status of the youth emerge (shown in biliet form; and as described by UNECA, 2009). These are that:

- Young people are more likely to be employed in sub-Saharan Africa than in North Africa, though the numbers of employed have fallen in both areas.
- Young people are less likely to be unemployed in sub-Saharan Africa, though the number of unemployed has fallen faster in North Africa in recent times.
- Most young North Africans are out of the labour force (inactive) because of enrolment in education, cultural attitudes regarding women in the workplace and the fact that young people are discouraged from finding a job; unlike the situation of young people in sub-Saharan Africa that have fewer means to support themselves in such situation.

Other sets of data show that there are considerable variations in the youth population size and labour force participation, unemployment rate and literacy level among the African countries. In general, the ratio of youth that are unemployed is very high, one to three in not only the entire continent of Africa, but in the whole of the world (ILO, 2006). This clearly points out the substantial difficulties of youth participation in the labor market. In sub-Saharan Africa, three in five of the total unemployed are youth and on the average, 72 per cent of the youth population lives on less than \$2 a day. As well, the quotes and analysed data above indicate that the information is not on young migrants per se, but on youth in general, from which deductions are made for young migrants, as follows:

- Youth are increasing in number in the labour force of Africa.
- The youths are not necessary qualified persons; neither are they well equipped to be absorbed gainfully.
- Economic conditions force them to seek employment undeservedly.
- Other economic indicators (rising youth unemployment rate; % in vulnerable employment) point to dismal employment conditions of young migrants in urban centres of Africa.

Therefore, the best that can be gathered from the features is that they indicate why the alternative opened to young migrants would be the informal sector of the urban economy; if so, the question is what should be done to empower them in order for the young migrants to achieve maximally.

Evolving Informal Employment in Africa

The development of the informal sector follows closely the general pattern of urban development, for example, in Nigeria. Each phase in the development of Nigeria's cities and economy has its own dynamics in informal sector development (Nwaka, 2005). Pre-colonial cities attracted large numbers of craftsmen and farmers and were centers of internal and international trade across the Sahara and the Atlantic. Many of these cities were chosen as colonial, administrative centers, while a few others were established and had other economic functions added to them. A sizeable number of adults were moving into the cities in search of white-collar jobs that the urban centers offered then. But, the post-colonial era is the major period in which informal sector witnessed large- scale, acknowledged growth. The expansion of the private sector and the pursuit of import-substitution industrialization gave a boost to urban employment and urban growth in both the formal and informal sectors.

Prior to the 1970s, the informal sector was not considered a separate sector in Nigeria. The activities were classified as traditional crafts and petty trade in the subsistence sector or as small-scale industries within the formal sector. But, with the expansion of the oil industry in the 1970s, and after the disruptions of the civil war, the urban population expanded rapidly because of the increase in urban-based opportunities in administration, construction, commerce and services, along with the gradual relegation of rural agriculture. The urban informal sector expanded correspondingly to meet the increased demand of low-income wage earners for moderately priced consumer goods and services. But the formal sector was still the focus of the government and little effort was made to foster formal/informal sector linkages between the formal and informal sectors.

About the same trend of increasing recognition of the informal sector in the national economy can be sketched for other African countries of recent. For many of them, the rise in the development of informal employment is associated with economic restructuring and economic crisis. The structural adjustment program of the 1980s and 1990s is said to have increased the informal economy. This is due to retrenchment of the public sector and associated liberalization policies that were adopted (NISER, 2008; CUTS CITEE, 2009). The large size of the sector, coupled with low entry and exit barriers and little sunk-cost suggest

that a sufficiently large proportion of people are likely to find their way into the informal sector. The informal sector, which has been described as a ‘sponge’ that soaks the excess demand of ‘surplus’ labor in urban centers, is the safety valve for the distressful relationship between excess labour in the face of insufficient employment openings (NISER, 2008). The ‘spongy’ nature of informal sector is based on its characteristics of free entry and exit, less regulated and underemployment nature.

Consequently, the informal sector is said to have been increasing by leaps and bounds in recent times. Chen (2001) stated that whereas in 1990, 21 per cent of sub-Saharan’s 227 million labour force was working in informal economy; by 1998 the sector comprised 40-60 per cent of urban employment; as evident on Table 5.

ILO (2010) highlights some of the general trends in the development of informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa, as:

- a decline or stagnation in formal employment opportunities
- an increase in informal sector activities, and an increasingly important contribution by the informal economy to a country’s GDP
- ...women are highly active in the informal economy; are over-represented in low income activities and under-represented in higher income activities. Street vending units, usually referred to as ‘informal traders’, make up a large proportion of informal sector’s enterprises.
- Informal economy is making an important contribution to African countries’ economic growth, as their GDP data reflect.
- Growth in the informal economy; while being more rapid in urban areas is also evident in rural communities

As well, other reports bring out some of these trends. For example, the Tanzanian Government believed that a third of the GDP originated from the small and medium enterprises (SME) sector. The SMEs operating in the informal sector alone consisted of more than 1.7 million businesses engaging about 3 million people, or about 20 per cent of the Tanzanian labour force (Ministry of Trade and Industry, Tanzania, 2001).

Also, the Integrated Labour Force Survey (ILFS, 2006) by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs in Tanzania, as reported in Gender Indicators Booklet (2010), reveals that wholesale and retail trade is the main industry, with 57 per cent; followed by manufacturing (14.4%), hotels and restaurants (12.9%), mining and quarry (2.8%) and services (2.6%). The wholesale and retail trade is owned mainly by households; the enterprises have no separate

legal entity that is independent of household members. ILFS (2006) further analyses the reasons for engaging in the informal sector, as: family need of additional income (55.5%); can't find other work (17.8%); business provides good income opportunity (9.2%); business does not require much capital (7.1%) and can combine business and household responsibilities (3.0%). Also, the unemployment rate was found to be highest in urban centres (3.6%), in particular Dares Salaam (16.6%) and for females (40.0%) than males (23.0%) in the same city.

Data for Kenya reveal that between 1991 and 1994, the informal sector grew by 16.1 per cent, which was faster than that for the formal sector that only grew at 1.6 per cent during the same period. Women constituted 46 per cent of the entrepreneurs and 40 per cent of the employees (Alder, 1998). The informal sector accounted for around 40 per cent (Sethuraman, 1997); and between 1985 and 1990, the informal economy grew at an estimated rate of 9 per cent per year.

The characteristics of informal workers in South Africa are depicted by ILO (2010), as:

- Majority had formal education, inclusive university experience
- Their motive for cross-border migration was economic
- Foreign traders employed South Africans in their business operations
- Many migrant street traders were women that entered on visitor's visa
- Migrant male traders came mainly from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia

Also, ILO (2010) reveals the condition in Angola and Mozambique, as:

- Rural-urban migrants ended up in the informal sector, and
- Motive for moving into the cities were mostly because of conflicts – political turmoil, civil wars, and destruction of infrastructure

For West Africa, informal workers are in varied informal activities, like in many other African countries. ILO (1998) gives the report of a survey, in which they featured as TV and radio repairers and hairdressers; these are occupations that were considered 'attractive'. About four-fifths of the workers, 83 and 85 per cent respectively, had some school education.

Moreover, Adepoju (2004) notes the increasing feminization of migration in the continent, in particular West Africa. Gradually, women were becoming self-employed, especially in the informal sector and were venturing farther afield. For example, the post-apartheid wave of immigrants from Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe into South Africa

comprised traders that were seeking to capitalize on the relatively affluent market of the latter. This is a process that is said to be invigorating the informal sector.

Likewise, Dejene (2001) gives the following on West Africa:

- Ample evidences of cross-border traders, and
- Wholesalers/retailers trading across the region, even up to the Far East and European cities, the preference being markets in Dubai and Hong Kong.

The review on Ghana by Braimah and King (2006) shows youth comprised 39 per cent of its total active population in 2000 (Ghana Population Census, 2000). At an annual population growth rate of 2.7 and economic growth rate between 4 and 5 per cent, there was the indication of the inability of the economy to provide jobs for the growing youths. Accordingly, a large percentage of the employed population, about two-thirds, and especially the youth were working in the informal sector as self-employed with no employees. The traditional apprenticeship in the informal sector provides the skill training for majority of the youth, between 80 to 90 per cent. Very few of the youth seeking employment make use of employment centers because only a negligible percentage of them that register are able to obtain job placement; and, as reported:

The youth often find it more difficult to find employment due to a number of factors including inexperience and discrimination in the open -labour market. Due to vulnerability of the youth in the labour market as many as 36.1% remained unemployed in 2000.

The growth of informal sector activities in Nigeria has been estimated by some to be as high as 75 per cent; employed more than 60 per cent of the urban workforce and accounted for well over half of urban employment (<http://www.enjoytravelling.net/nigeria/index.htm>). As well, the National Bureau of Statistics (2005) reveals that the sector accounted for more than 70 per cent of Nigeria's economic activities and 60 per cent of the country's employment. Its contribution is still on the increase.

Further on Nigeria, Sher Verick (ECA) writes that about 33 percent of the work force, that is, the addition of the average unemployment and underemployment rates, of 16 and 17 per cent respectively might have been denied the opportunity of contributing fully to the country's wealth creation. Other features of the employment situation in Nigeria that the writer notes are:

- ✓ Nigeria's labour force growth rate of 2.8 per cent exceeds the annual rate of employment growth which is estimated to be less than 1 per cent.

- Rural unemployment rates in all states are almost three times the corresponding rates in the urban areas; thereby, confirming the rural nature of Nigeria's unemployment problem.
- Tertiary graduate unemployment has remained at an average of 15 per cent per annum.
- Nigerian youths (15 – 24 years) bear the greatest burden of unemployment with rates averaging 40 – 60 per cent between the 80s and the 90s.
- In more recent years, female unemployment rates have been much higher than the male rates.
- The number of students graduating from the school system into the labour market annually is estimated at about 3 million. The labour market is estimated to absorb only 10 per cent of this number annually.

Moreover, Sher Verick (ECA) states:

Beyond published statistics, evidence abounds indicating massive and continuing job losses, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Private sector industries, especially manufacturing have continued to shed jobs. The resulting employment crisis has resulted in a situation where nowadays, university graduates stand on street corners selling telephone recharge cards, or roam the streets as newspaper vendors, while others engage themselves as commercial motorcycle and taxi drivers. Faced with the growing unemployment situation in the country, the informal sector has continued to grow as the unemployed seek stop-gap anchorage in the sector. While the informal sector replicates virtually all economies, the size of Nigeria's informal sector poses challenges, not only for economic development, but also for the capacity to employ effectively, policy to determine economic outcomes.

The results of the survey carried out by NISER (2008) indicate youths, of 15-24 years old, accounted for 32.7 per cent of the sample population. Majority of the owners and paid workers had high academic qualifications. This implies that more educated workers were engaged in informal sector. The reasons advanced for these characteristics were economic recession and reforms that had thrown many workers out of the formal employment, and the large out-turn of graduates from tertiary institutions in the labour market.

In addition, the survey found out that the most popular mode of skill acquisition in the informal sector is the apprenticeship system. New developments in the informal sector are the prominence of motor cyclist drivers, hawkers of recharge cards and operators of cybercafés, among others. Personal interest and choice to set up their own business enterprises dominated motivation for setting up informal enterprises, with 77.1 per cent of the respondents. It is followed by survival strategy (48.3%), inability to obtain wage job (22.5%); influence of parents (19.1%); inability of workers in informal sector furthering their education (15.1%); retrenchment/withdrawal from formal sector job and or post-retirement exercise (3%).

In sum, the reviews reveal the increasing number of the youth in the informal sector of their respective countries and the development of the sector. References were also on the increasing feature of unemployed university graduates and engagement of youths in jobs

created by new technologies in the market. But, in virtually all the reviews, the focus was not on young migrants.

Youth Migration and Employment in Informal Sector

The review of the few cases that focus on young migrants in African urban centres in the informal sector is presented, in order to highlight the manner in which they got established over time. Also, the reviews are towards appreciating the preference of the young migrants for self-employment, the individuality of their action and corporate behaviours in getting inserted into the informal activities.

Zimbabwean emigrants in South Africa were the subject of Matshaka (2009), in which are treated the age-sex composition of the emigrants, reasons for their emigration, and involvement in informal sector. A significant fraction of the current wave of migration in South Africa was said to be young men, between ages 19 to 30, who had lived from six months to over five years. They live in the working class townships located at the fringes of Cape Town; are mainly street traders of music and sports goods. Also, the youth explore various art forms, one of which is crafting of wire and beads. The street traders buy and sell goods from Chinese shops. These cover car cell phone chargers, toys, rugby jerseys and other sports paraphernalia. Their interest is on the first two named items, especially the 'latest disc', which has a relatively large market.

The Zimbabwean male emigrants try to distinguish themselves and assert masculinity in crafts, in particular the making and sale of wire and beads. Through established networks, consisting of both non-kin and kin, the young men got introduced and guided into informal street trade. During the initial period, many of the newcomers learn the craft from seasoned craftsmen. The craft is perceived to be more valuable and sustainable trade for the males than other street trade, such as periodic selling of fruit or fresh flowers that some local women engage in. The young men identify self-employment as more attractive than paid work in the formal sector. For them, their involvement in the informal sector is not just a stopgap while they look for wage employment, but an innovative stepping stone, which they use to accumulate capital. The masculine ideals of individualism and collectivism are ways the young men operate: they act autonomously in taking to the crafts and collectively, as they depend on more experienced friends/relatives for motivation, accommodation, sharing of meals, and training and for take-off capital (Matshaka, 2009).

Amin (2010) shows that roughly half of the businesses that were surveyed in Burkina Faso, Cameroons and Cape Verde were owned by immigrants; however, the proportion for young immigrants was not analysed; but could be expected to be low, since, they are still young. Also, the immigrants were from a relatively less privileged background; were male, unmarried and migrated when young, averaging 31 years old for the recent immigrants compared to 39 years old for earlier immigrants and the natives. There were also differences

in their performances compared with those of the natives. For example, recent immigrants preferred retailing to manufacturing; the reason given is: “Pure retailing, with low entry and exit costs may be a natural starting point for such immigrants”. Also, recent immigrants operated from outside than inside household premises.

Relevant findings of a survey of traders in Lagos metropolis, Nigeria, by Afolayan et al (2010) on youth migration are also on the high level of masculinity of the respondents, their literacy level and the training system. The focus was on traders that specialise in the latest and fast moving imported goods and commodities, such as motor and machinery, automobile spare parts, computers and accessories, GSM and accessories and imported wears, ICT goods and household utensils. Majority of the traders (84%) were in-migrants into Lagos; from states within the South-East zone of Nigeria, in particular the Igbo people. Many of them moved in just after they finished their secondary school education and had trading as their choice occupation, right from their source region, because of family influence, perception of the lucrative nature of the business, as a way of supplementing their income, for love of the business, and because of unemployment. Majority of the traders were assisted by ‘masters’, who formed the chain network for the traders to move into the metropolis in the first case. The young traders were trained by the masters and most often, were assisted financially with ‘seed’ money or capital for taking off. Other sources of help are friends and kinsmen. Apprenticeship is often at the point of the activity, Lagos metropolis.

Other relevant findings of the survey include the development of international trading that took off from internal trading, which social networking made possible. This reflects the interconnectivity of the migration system as the secondary school graduates become apprenticed to migrant traders in Lagos and as the apprentice are put through international trading by the master traders. Also, the longer number of hours spent trading daily, of nine hours, further reveals the informal nature of their activity.

Moreover, both trainees, on completion of training and the mentors trade within Nigeria; thus, internal mobility into Lagos market serves as stepping stone to markets outside the country, and membership in market association is a pooling factor and or social networking for specialization in trading certain commodities, which can only be sourced from outside the country. However, very few youth were involved in international trips outside of the country; based on the fact that majority of them were still receiving training. The very few youth are those that the masters-mentors are training towards international trading.

West Asia destinations were the most prominent, in particular China, Dubai, Japan and Hong Kong. Others are the United Arab Emirate (UAE), Taiwan, Singapore, India, Thailand, Spain and Italy. In contrast, there exists a low level of business and trade transactions between Nigeria and Africa; prominent West African markets patronized were Benin Republic (Cotonou) and Ghana (Accra). These are followed by Algeria, Zimbabwe, Cameroun and Sierra Leone. Other international markets are Germany, France, Holland, the United States of America and Brazil. No doubt, the choice of destination by traders (mostly adults, with the

experience and means of choosing) was a function of the type of goods in vogue, the known places for their production, the profit maximization and least cost efforts of the traders.

In essence, while the review of the surveys and analysed data brought out new trends in the migration and development of the informal sector, still, the cases reviewed show the focus is on business development, rather than youth migration. The review does not beam closely on the youth in search of a livelihood in an urban setting, such that we could have in-depth knowledge on issues that are pertinent to them, among other grey areas of research. Of particular interest would have been examinations of their vulnerable employment situation, in particular the graduates of secondary and tertiary educational levels, their fervent desire for gainful employment and or assurance of a brighter future. These are other areas of research into the development of informal employment of young migrants in urban centers.

Economic Thrust of Youth Programs and Policy Implications

The economic thrust of youth programs is examined as a way of appreciating what this holds for young migrants in urban setting and the policy implications. It should be noted that each of the programs considered below is on youth employment and not necessarily on young migrants. Nonetheless, they are reviewed for whatever could be the fall-out for the latter.

Youth employment is being mainstreamed into national development frameworks and policies. There are four types of active labour market policies (ALMP) envisaged for young people. These cover policies to improve the employability of young people; policies to create employment opportunities for young people; policies to improve the functioning of the labour market for young people and policies to protect the rights of young workers (and as reported in UNECA, 2009; based on Kluge, 2006; Rother, 2006).

No doubt, each of these ALMP is to address the vulnerability of young workers in both the formal and informal sectors. Nevertheless, the policies should be much more comprehensive to address likely added vulnerability and competition that young migrants would be faced with, as they compete with the already full and unsatisfied youth labour force in the urban centers.

World Bank Report (2008/2009) has also highlighted some programs or activities that will address youth issues, but not necessarily, youth migration, as follows:

- Need to sustain higher economic growth that creates jobs
- Youth employment should be addressed in national policies for growth and poverty reduction
- Small and Medium Sized enterprises should be given access to finance long-term investments
- More focus should be on the production sectors, and
- Ensure adequate quality and level of education and training that match the need of the private sector, and

- Promote entrepreneurship.

But, young people are likely to have limited business networks and contacts compared with older people. Consequently, access of young people to micro credit and promotion of public-private partnerships are proposed as solution to some of the problems that confront their engagement in the informal sector.

In addition, ILO (2009) proposes other solutions to job skills mismatches, as:

- The incidence of this barrier is illustrated by the popularity of active labour market training programmes. An overview study of the YEI highlights the high frequency of training programmes compared to other measures such as employment services, wage/employment subsidies, and public works and entrepreneurship schemes for youth.

Among other attempts at addressing problems confronting youth employment in Africa are education, training and employment. For example, Kenya has set the pace in educational innovations, with a particular emphasis on promoting self-employment and self-reliance. This informed its inclusion of Business Education, Home Science and Arts in the school curriculum and the development of Vocational Training Institutions (King, 1995).

The Mubarak-Kohl initiative in Egypt, established in 1991, aimed at bringing together the public and private sectors to provide training for young people. The attempts made have focused on vocational and technical skills demanded by the Egyptian labour market. Through the initiative, about 16,000 young people have been trained in 1,600 companies (www.gtzt.de; UNECA, 2009).

The Microsoft Corporation joint venture with the International Youth Foundation (IYF) in Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania is a form of partnership that focuses on a Youth Empowerment Programme; aimed at improving the employability prospects of disadvantaged African youth, aged 16-35, through targeted high-quality information and communication technology (ICT) and other skills training (NaijaHotJobs.com 2007).

In addition, many of the African countries have programs that are tailored towards job and employment generations (Okojie, 2003; Nwaka, 2005). For Nigeria, the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), established on November 22nd 1986, is the national agency for tackling unemployment in the country. Its mandate includes the following:

- Design and implement programs to combat mass unemployment
- Articulate policies aimed at developing work programs with labour intensive potentials
- Obtain and maintain a databank on employment and vacancies in the country with a view to acting as a clearing house to link job-seekers with employers of labour.

Its four core programs are:

- Rural Employment Promotion Programme
- Special Public Works Programme
- Small Scale Enterprises Programme, and
- Vocational Skills Development Programme

Each program has several sub-programs, and the overriding objectives were to give training opportunities to the unemployed, especially the youth, by providing guidance, finance and other support services, to help them create jobs for themselves and for others. A major problem of the program has been inadequate funding. However, compared with the numbers of unemployed youth in Nigeria, only a small proportion has benefited from NDE programs.

Dike (2009), the Association of Episcopal Conferences of Anglophone West Africa (AECAWA) in Banjul (Aug. 2009) and other Non-Governmental Organizations, NGOs, have buttressed the need for government to provide their citizens with the critical skills and resources to realize their full potential, in particular vocational and technical education. Others, for example, Akintoye (2008) have advised the government to ease accessibility to credit.

The Youth Employment Network Initiative (UN, 2004, Paragraph 19, p. 6) is another proposal that Braimah and King (2006) consider in connection with ICT sector for job creation, in particular for the youth, as:

- Rapidly changing technological advancement and the youth (particularly the males), who happen to be more daring, are mostly attracted to jobs in the sector.
- Direct employment opportunities to young people with high tech skills, such as, software engineering, which can even transcend national boundaries through outsourcing of data processing.
- Employment opportunities, such as, call centers should be developed – these are options better suited for young people with junior and senior secondary or tertiary educational qualifications.
- Other employment opportunities that can be created by the sector include assembly, sale and repair of ICT equipment including computers, television sets, musical instruments, telephones and accessories, etc.
- Retail communication services or communication centers are another broad category of job creation by the ICT sector. ICT also enhances skills of youths in securing jobs.
- The springing up of ICT training schools to fill up this skill gap creates job opportunities for trainers who are mainly young persons.

The ICT is about the fastest service segment in many African countries. Its services are in diverse locations, especially the urban areas. It offers relatively large numbers of business opportunities, but low level of full employment for youths, based on their qualification. A significant number of youths who otherwise would have been unemployed are engaged in

these jobs. These and other job avenues are areas to be explored for their viability in creating enduring, job opportunities for increasing numbers of young migrants in many African cities and towns.

Conclusion

Youth migration is bringing to the fore the relatively shelved discourse on urbanization and development of informal employment in Africa. It has been examined as an increasing force in effective policy on urban economy; premised on the fact that the youth that move in larger number into African urban centers for educational advancement and more of recent, for skill development opportunities, are ill-equipped for formal economic activities; hence, the high and increasing proportion in informal employment.

The paper has, therefore, demonstrated the interwoven nature of youth migration, in relation to the other two processes, of urbanization and the development of informal employment, as it impacts development. The conclusion is on the need for an effective, multi-dimensional economic package for resolving problems of youth migration that is spurred on by increasing urbanization in Africa.

Paucity of data in gauging the relationship of youth migration in Africa with urbanization and development of informal employment has, however, posed limitations on our knowledge. This is a challenge of a research frontier that covers about a fifth of total population in our environment. As youth are the foundations of tomorrow leaders and pace setters for next generation, all efforts should be mustered to arrest the trend of a wasted generation. Meaningful and effective policies are based on reliable and accurate data; therefore, concerted efforts should be made to disaggregate the data in order to capture better the situation of youth migration in Africa.

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Table 1a: Youth Population, Employment and Unemployment, 1997 and 2007

		Total		Male		Female
	1997	2007	1997	2007	1997	2007
Youth population ('000)						
North Africa	33'963	40'369	17'218	20'441	16'745	19'929
Sub-Saharan Africa	117,665	157,100	58,680	78,733	58,985	78,367
Youth employment ('000)						
North Africa	9'686	10'872	6'999	7'530	2'688	3'342
Sub-Saharan Africa	60'313	78'188	33'760	43'037	26'553	35'151
Youth unemployment ('000)						
North Africa	3'275	3'394	2'085	1'899	1'189	1'495
Sub-Saharan Africa	8'253	10'201	4'412	5'371	3'841	4'830

Source: ILO: Global Employment Trends for Youth, 2007

Table 1b: Youth Population and Labour Force Participation Rates, Africa

Country	% of Total Population	Median Age (Yrs)	Labour Force Participation Rate, Youth (15-24 Yrs)		
	2000		All	Male (1985)	Female (1985)
Algeria	21.2	21.1	34	32	2
Angola	19	16.2	30	26	4
Benin	20.2	16.5	29	17	12
Botswana	21.5	18.5	28	15	13
Burkina Faso	19.8	16.4	25.2	14	11.2 (1991)
Burundi	19.7	17.3	29	16	13
Cameroon	19.9	18	26	15	11
Cape Verde	21.2	19.8	28	25	3
Central Africa Republic	19.7	19	29	15	14
Chad	19.1	18.4	27	21	6
Comoros	20.6	17.2	5	16	10
Congo	19.4	17.1	22	14	8
Cote d'Ivoire	21.1	18	29	16	13
Democratic Republic of the Congo	18.9	15.9	29	20	9
Djibouti	19.3	2	>30	25	-25
Egypt	20.2	22.2	21	14.6	6.4 (1994)
Equatorial Guinea	18.5	18.4	26	25	1
Eritrea	19	18.1	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ethiopia	18.3	16.5	29.8	17.1	12.7
Gabon	17.1	20.7	20	13	7
Gambia	17.7	19.5	27	14	13
Ghana	19.7	18	29	17	12
Guinea	19.1	16.4	28	17	11

Guinea-Bissau	18.7	19.1	26	25	1
Kenya	22.5	17.7	29	20	9
Lesotho	20.1	19.1	23	14	9
Liberia	19.9	17.9	25	17	8
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	19.4	17.5	26	24	2
Madagascar	19.8	16.9	29	16	13
Malawi	20	16.6	28	18	10
Mali	19	16.3	30	16	14
Mauritania	20.6	18.8	29	28	1
Mauritius	18	18.8	23.2	14.6	8.6
Morocco	20.8	22.8	31	25	6
Mozambique	19.1	17.5	28	21	7
Namibia	19.8	19	>25	0	0
Niger	18.9	15.7	31	28	3
Nigeria	19.2	17.4	26	16	10
Rwanda	21.5	17.3	31	15	16
Sao Tome and Principe	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Senegal	20	18	28	17	11
Seychelles	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sierra Leone	19	17.9	26	17	9
Somalia	18.9	16	30	22	8
South Africa	19.3	22	30	17	13
Sudan	21.6	19.9	31	27	4
Swaziland	20.9	18.8	25	14	11
Togo	19.5	17.1	28	17	11
Tunisia	20.2	23.8	32	27	5
Uganda	20	15.4	>25	n/a	n/a
United Republic of Tanzania	20.1	17.2	29	19	10
Zambia	22.3	16.5	>25	n/a	n/a
Zimbabwe	20.6	17.8	32.3	17.8	14.5 (1992)

**Source: UN, Youth at the United Nations, Comparison of Country Profiles –Africa.
2007**

Table 2a: Access to Education and Outcomes in Africa

Indicator	Sub-Saharan Africa	North Africa
Net primary enrolment ratio (per cent)^a	70.7	95.0
GPI net primary enrolment ratio^a	0.89	0.93
Youth literacy rate (per cent)^b	72.1	86.5
GPI youth literacy rate^b	0.87	0.91
Gross secondary enrolment ratio (per cent)^a	32	68^c
GPI gross secondary enrolment ratio^a	0.80	0.99
Gross tertiary enrolment ratio (per cent)^a	5	22^c
GPI tertiary enrolment ratio^a	0.67	1.00^c

Source: United Nations Statistics Division, mdgs.un.org; UNESCO Institute of Statistics www.uis.unesco.org

Notes: GPI – gender parity index; a Data is for 2006; b Data for 2007; c Data for the Middle East and North Africa

Table2b: Youth Literacy Rates, Africa

	All Youth 1985	All Youth 2000	Female Literacy Rate 2000	Female Rate as a % of Male 2000
Country				
Algeria	69.5	89	84.2	90
Angola			0	0
Benin	33.9	53.1	36	51
Botswana	9	88.3	92.1	109
Burkina Faso	20.9	34.6	23.3	51
Burundi	45.5	63.9	62	94
Cameroon	81.7	93.7	93	99
Cape Verde	77	88.1	85	93
Central Africa Republic	45.1	67.2	58.8	77
Chad	39	66.6	59.9	82
Comoros	55.8	58.7	51.8	79
Congo	87.6	97.4	96.8	99
Cote d'Ivoire	42.9	65	59.7	85
Democratic Republic of the Congo	61.4	96.9	74.9	85
Djibouti	66.6	84	79.4	90
Egypt	57	69.8	62.7	82
Equatorial Guinea	89.1	96.6	95.4	97
Eritrea	55.9	70.2	60.4	75
Ethiopia	37.5	54.8	48.8	79
Gabon	0	0	0	0
Gambia	35.2	57.1	48.8	74
Ghana	74.8	91	88.3	94
Guinea	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	38	58.2	43.4	59
Kenya	85	95.1	94.2	98
Lesotho	85.1	90.5	98.5	119
Liberia	0	0	0	0
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	86.7	96.5	93.1	93
Madagascar	67.7	80.1	76.6	92
Malawi	59.3	71.1	61	75
Mali	34.9	66.3	60.2	83
Mauritania	37.9	48.9	40.6	71
Mauritius	89.3	93.4	94.4	101

Morocco	48.3	67.4	58.3	77
Mozambique	43.2	60.6	46.2	61
Namibia	84.7	91.6	93.3	104
Niger	0	0	13.7	42
Nigeria	64.7	86.8	83.8	93
Rwanda	65.9	83.3	81.4	95
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	0
Senegal	34.9	50.7	41.7	70
Seychelles	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0
Somalia	0	0	0	0
South Africa	86.8	91.3	91.3	100
Sudan	57.7	77.2	71.5	86
Swaziland	81.5	90.4	91.2	102
Togo	56.9	75.4	63.7	73
Tunisia	78.3	93.4	89.2	92
Uganda	65.3	78.8	72.1	84
United Republic of Tanzania	2	90.6	87.9	94
Zambia	77.2	88.3	85.5	94
Zimbabwe	90.2	97.2	95.7	97
Sub-Saharan Africa	61.7	77.7	0	0

Sources: 1) ECA, 2002, Youth and Employment in the ECA Region

2) UNDP, 2002, Human Development Report, 2002

Table 3a: Annual Real GDP Growth Rate in Africa (%)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
North Africa	3.7	5.9	4.1	4.2	4.4	3.5	5.1	4.8	4.6	6.0	6.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.8	2.5	2.5	3.6	4.9	6.7	4.9	6.9	6.2	6.0	6.6

Source: UNDP June 2010

Table 3b: Per Capita GDP Growth vs. Poverty Reduction by Region, 1981- 2005

Region/Variable – Period	P.C GDP growth		\$1.25 P0 growth		\$2.50 P0 growth	
	1981-95	1996-05	1981-96	1996-05	1981-96	1996-05
East Asia and Pacific (EAP)	6.894	6.355	-5.126	- 8.481	1.616	-4.331
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA)	-3.434	4.138	6.769	-2.594	1.229	-3.911
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)	0.140	1.394	-1.083	-3.176	-0.605	-2.538
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	0.713	2.309	-4.347	-1.445	-1.215	-1.484
South Asia (SAS)	3.208	4.143	-1.548	-1.710	-0.296	*
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)	-1.009	1.293	0.644	-1.597	0.270 -	0.517

Source: Adapted from Fosu (2010). In: UNDP, June 2010

Notes: All figures are annual averages and are in percent. P.C.GDP growth rates are calculated from World Bank (2009b) as averages of annual regional values. P_0 is the headcount ratio and its growth rate is annualized: calculated as the logarithmic difference ($d\log P_0$) of ending-year value and beginning-year value, divided by the number of years between the two years, x 100 percent, based on data from World Bank (2009a).

Table 4a: Youth Labour Force Participation Rates, 1997, 2006 and 2007

		Total (%)			Male (%)			Female (%)	
	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007
North Africa	38.2	35.6	35.3	52.8	46.9	46.1	23.2	24.1	24.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	58.3	56.6	56.3	65.1	62.1	61.5	51.5	51.1	51.0

Sources: 1) UN, Youth at the United Nations, Comparison of Country Profiles – Africa
2) ECA, 2002, Youth and Employment in the ECA Region

Table 4b: Youth Employment-to-Population Ratios, 1997, 2006 and 2007

		Total (%)			Male (%)			Female (%)	
	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007
North Africa	28.5	27.2	26.9	40.6	37.4	36.8	16.0	16.7	16.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	51.3	50.1	49.8	57.5	55.2	54.7	45.0	44.9	44.9

Sources: 1) UN, Youth at the United Nations, Comparison of Country Profiles – Africa
2) ECA, 2002, Youth and Employment in the ECA Region

Table 4c: Youth Unemployment Rates, 1997, 2006 and 2007

		Total (%)			Male (%)			Female (%)	
	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007
North Africa	25.3	23.7	23.8	23.0	20.2	20.1	30.7	30.7	30.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	12.0	11.6	11.5	11.6	11.2	11.1	12.6	12.1	12.1

Sources: 1) UN, Youth at the United Nations, Comparison of Country Profiles – Africa
2) ECA, 2002, Youth and Employment in the ECA Region

Table 4d: Ratios of Youth-to-Adult Unemployment Rate, 1997, 2006 and 2007

		Total (%)			Male (%)			Female (%)	
	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007
North Africa	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.8	3.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.0	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.8

Sources: 1) UN, Youth at the United Nations, Comparison of Country Profiles – Africa

2) ECA, 2002, Youth and Employment in the ECA Region

Table 4e: Youth Share of Working –Age Population; Youth Share of Total Unemployment and Youth Unemployed as Percentage of the Youth Population, 1997, 2006 and 2007

	Youth share of working-age population (%)			Youth share of total unemployed (%)			Youth unemployed as (%) of youth population		
	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007
North Africa	33.1	31.0	30.5	51.7	49.0	48.2	9.6	8.4	8.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	35.7	36.1	36.1	45.3	42.6	42.2	7.0	6.6	6.5

Sources: 1) UN, Youth at the United Nations, Comparison of Country Profiles – Africa

2) ECA, 2002, Youth and Employment in the ECA Region

Table 4f: Youth Inactivity, 1997, 2006 and 2007

	Inactive youth ('000s)			Youth inactive rate (%)			Female share of inactive youth, 2007
	1997	2006	2007	1997	2006	2007	(%)
North Africa	21'002	25'829	26'104	61.8	64.4	64.7	57.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	49'099	66'463	68'711	41.7	43.4	43.7	55.9

Sources: 1) UN, Youth at the United Nations, Comparison of Country Profiles – Africa

2) ECA, 2002, Youth and Employment in the ECA Region

Table 5: Size of the Informal Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa

Size of the Informal Economy on the African Continent	
Informal Economy as share of	Percent

Non-Agricultural Employment	78
Urban Employment	61
New Jobs	93

Source: Chen (2001).