

# Estructuras Familiares, Actitudes y Valores en Chile<sup>1</sup>

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## Resumen

La proporción de nacimientos extramatrimoniales en Chile ha aumentado desde 15,9% en 1960 a 64,8% en 2008. La convivencia también ha aumentado, más lenta y recientemente. En otros contextos, estos indicadores son considerados señal de la Segunda Transición Demográfica (SDT). Este artículo analiza diferencias en actitudes y valores de madres primerizas en diferentes estructuras familiares, preguntando hasta qué punto el alto porcentaje de nacimientos extramatrimoniales en Chile puede ser considerado una señal de rechazo ideológico a estructuras familiares tradicionales, como la SDT propondría. Los datos provienen de una encuesta postparto implementada en Santiago (n=686). Los resultados indican que en términos de actitudes y valores no hay gran variabilidad: las mujeres que viven en estructuras no tradicionales no son más liberales que las que viven en estructuras tradicionales. Las mujeres no casadas tienen una actitud menos favorable hacia el matrimonio, pero no hay mayores diferencias en la aprobación del divorcio, la igualdad de género, la autonomía individual y la tolerancia. Este estudio propone que la desestimación del matrimonio es más una manera de auto-justificar el estado civil actual que un rechazo ideológico hacia la institución del matrimonio, a juzgar por el alto porcentaje de mujeres que espera casarse en el futuro.

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## **Family Arrangements, Attitudes and Values in Chile**

The Chilean family system has gone through several impressive changes in the last decades. Even though the Chilean society is in general viewed as a rather conservative one, where the influence of the Catholic Church fosters traditional family and sexual behaviors, cohabitation has increased, especially among young cohorts, and 63 percent of births were nonmarital in 2008 (Elgueda 2009). Most of nonmarital births (61 percent) were due to cohabiting mothers. In this paper, I focus on women's values and attitudes, as possible determinants of their fertility and family behaviors. As proposed by Lesthaeghe, changes in values are the engine of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). By comparing women in different family structures, I aim to find out whether women in nontraditional structures hold more liberal values than women in more traditional structures, so that one could argue that non-traditional beliefs are behind these women fertility and family decisions. Alternatively, if the ideas of women in nontraditional family structures are not liberal, then the reasons the changes we observe are probably not value driven. Data for this study comes from a postpartum survey implemented in the capital city between September 2008 and January 2009. The sample size reaches 686 women.

### **BACKGROUND**

The association between values and family formation is in the core of the SDT theory. Since the first manifestations of the phenomenon, in the 1960's, changes such as postponement of marriage and childbearing, and increases in cohabitation and divorce in Northern Europe were interpreted as reflecting that decade changes in values. The new values include an emphasis on

individual autonomy in ethical, moral and politic affairs, the rejection of institutional authority, and the rise of what has been called expressive values –values that respond to higher order needs and demands of self-actualization, as opposed to subsistence demands (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). The advocates of the SDT theory argue that even in countries where the SDT started later (Central and Eastern Europe, the U.S.), the retreat from marriage and childbirth are a permanent response to changes in values, and not only temporary adjustments to economic crises. They believe the association between values and living arrangements is recursive: based on their values, people self-select themselves into determined family structures and, after some time living in those structures, they adapt their values in a way that is coherent with the type of family they live in (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004).

Critiques of the SDT have claimed that the values-behaviors association is weak. Would the relation be strong, one would expect to find the most extreme indicators of the SDT in societies that rank high in individual autonomy, questioning of traditional institutions, and expressive values. Therefore, the acceptance of nontraditional family forms and behaviors, such as cohabitation, same gender couples, nonmarital births, and divorce, should be high. But fertility has reached lowest-low levels in Asia and Southern Europe, regions where most people still hold traditional attitudes towards family arrangements and sex, and behaviors such as cohabitation and giving birth outside of marriage are still scarce (Coleman 2004). Also, cohabitation, divorce and nonmarital births have increased in several former Soviet Union countries since the 1980's, but in those settings post-material values are not as developed there as they are in Western Europe. Therefore, it is unlikely that most of poeple make their family and fertility decisions driven by postmodern values. Such values may be associated with the behavior of the richest

groups, but the decisions made by most people are more likely related to the economic insecurity and turmoil that followed the fall of the wall (Coleman 2004).

In a similar vein, U.S. based research has examined how the increasing proportions of cohabiting couples and of children born to unmarried mothers respond to poverty and vulnerability, instead of postmodern values. It has been argued that some features of the SDT, such as nonmarital fertility and high levels of union dissolution, are easily found among ethnic minorities and low socioeconomic status people, while other features, such as high levels of female labor force participation, marriage postponement or the involvement of fathers in childrearing, are more common among high socioeconomic status, White people (McLanahan 2004; Osborne and McLanahan 2007; Raley 2001). Instead of being a legitimate, permanent alternative to marriage, cohabitation in the U.S. seems to be a trial exercise that allows people to weed out unpromising unions (Lichter, Qian, and Mellott 2006), or the union type in which low socioeconomic status groups are selected into (Edin and Reed 2005; McLanahan 2004).

In a similar way, it has been argued that a dual nuptial system exists in Latin America: the choice between marriage and cohabitation does not depend on people's preferences, but on socioeconomic constraints, which make the poor more likely to cohabit. Cohabitation levels have traditionally been high in the region --even though in the Southern cone they have lower than in Central America and the Caribbean--, so that both marriage and cohabitation are socially recognized as valid types of unions and as suitable environments for childbearing. But marriage has a social value that cohabitation lacks. Marriage provides more economic and legal security for women and children, it is seen as a more enduring commitment, and it defines a clear status

for women regarding her spouse and in-law relatives (Castro-Martín 2002). Cohabiting women in Latin America generally want to marry, but lack the financial means to do it.

The study of the relation between family arrangements and attitudes and values must take into consideration other variables that affect people's beliefs. There is widespread evidence that more educated people holds more liberal views about family and sexual behavior. Other characteristics that affect people attitudes and behaviors in these realms are age, religion, and family background. Age is an indicator of the stage of the life cycle in which people are. Surkyn and Lesthaeghe show that single people living with their parents hold conventional views. They are probably in their late adolescent years and have been supervised most of their lives by their parents and schools. As people age and move towards other stages in the life cycle, they may become more liberal, but they also may reinforce their conventionalism. Those who leave their parents' houses to live by their own or to cohabit are more liberal than people who leave to marry. Bearing children pushes people towards conventionalism, as it "closes open futures" and directs the attention to the wellbeing of future generations. The conservative effect of parenthood holds even among cohabiters, who probably have followed a path of more liberal thinking until childbirth. Parenting has a stronger than the effect marrying in moving people towards more conservative positions (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004).

Religion affects both individuals' attitudes towards family and sex and the way the society sanctions those attitudes. At the macro level, it is generally recognized that the Catholic Church has an impressive power in the Chilean legal and social scenes. It blocked the approval of a divorce law until 2004, and it continues opposing changes in the abortion legislation, which it is recognized as the strictest in the world, ruling abortion as illegal even in cases of rape and

when a woman's life is at risk. Also, the Catholic Church has opposed efforts to develop proper sex education programs (Lehrer and Lehrer 2009). At the micro level, one would expect that more religious people hold more conservative attitudes on family and sexual issues. Studying the Philippines, the only Catholic country in Southeast Asia, Williams, Kabamalan and Ogena find that people who attend to church more often are less likely to cohabit and to approve cohabitation (Williams, Kabamalan, and Ogena 2007). In a less recent study in Detroit, Thornton, Axinn and Hill found that less religious people were more likely to cohabit instead of marrying, and that cohabitation was associated with decreases of religiosity through time, while marriage was associated with increases in religiosity (Thornton, Axinn, and Hill 1992).

Regarding family background, people who grew up in non-intact families are more likely to approve and to engage in more liberal behaviors regarding family and sex (Williams, Kabamalan, and Ogena 2007). On the one hand, it is possible that being exposed to less orthodox structures increase people's tolerance towards those behaviors, but it is also possible that people coming from non-intact families are currently financially disadvantaged, so they may cohabit and bear children outside of marriage because of necessity instead of principles. The effect of education on family behaviors is also confounding. More educated people are likely to hold more liberal attitudes and such attitudes may move them towards more liberal behaviors, but education is also a proxy of socioeconomic status, and the better-off are probably not forced to engage in non-traditional behaviors by need (Williams, Kabamalan, and Ogena 2007). In this vein, the poor may live in heterodox structures because of economic need and because they have not been exposed to the non-conformist effect of acquiring more education.

## **The Chilean Context**

Chile is an interesting case for studying these issues, because the country presents some, but not all of the SDT indicators. The proposers of the theory have argued that multiple mixes of the SDT ingredients may emerge in different variants of the phenomenon (Lesthaeghe 2010). In Chile, the total fertility rate is below replacement, reaching 1.9 in 2008 (Census Bureau 2010). The proportion of nonmarital births increased from 15.9 percent in 1960 to 64.9 percent in 2008 (Elgueta 2009). Cohabitation has increased too, but more slowly and recently. The increase in cohabitation took off in the 1990s, especially among the youth. In 2002, the proportion of cohabiters among couples in the 18 to 24 years interval was 45.7 percent, but it was only 16 percent among all couples over 18 years old (Salinas 2009). While these demographic changes were taking place, education expanded considerably, with 80 percent of people aged 20 to 24 completing at least 12 years of schooling in 2006 (MIDEPLAN 2007c). Since the mid 1980s, the economy has grown with relative stability, as inflation remains low and the country overcomes economic downturns. Poverty has diminished, measuring in 2006 one-third the level registered in 1990 (MIDEPLAN 2007b). Income inequality, however, remains high, as the richest 10 percent of the population receives about 40 percent of the total income (MIDEPLAN 2007a), and labor instability has increased (Roberts and Grimson 2005). Even though female labor force participation has grown, it is below both Latin American and most developed countries rates: 40 percent of Chilean women were in the labor force in 2008 (INE 2009), while 53 percent of women in most developed countries and in Latin America as a region were.

Under these circumstances, asking about the values of women living in different family arrangements may help to better understand the family changes Chile is going through. In

particular, it may help to clarify whether the increase in the proportion of children born out of marriage and the increase of cohabitation actually indicate that increasing individualization and similar processes are taking place in the country or if the SDT indicators we observe respond other reasons.

## **DATA AND METHODS**

### **Sample**

This paper uses a postpartum survey implemented in Santiago -- the capital city, where 33 percent of the population lives-- between September 2008 and January 2009. Interviews were performed in five hospitals. The sample size is 686 women. Mothers were eligible to participate if they were 18 years or older, bearing their first child, and their health or their babies' was not compromised immediately upon delivery<sup>3</sup>. The sample design was not probabilistic. Rather than claiming statistical representation, the sample aims to draw a first, thorough image of the differences between married and unmarried mothers in Chile. The cross-sectional character of the postpartum survey, and its relatively small sample size complicate the study of values and attitudes. Given the recursive nature of the association between values and family structures, ideally one would use longitudinal data and a large sample, which would allow analyzing some specific, innovative groups (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). In spite of these limitations, the survey included many questions on attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation and singlehood, sex, and other ethical issues that are part of the discussion of the SDT, such as gender equality, tolerance and individual autonomy. And the data allows describing all these topics using a family

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<sup>3</sup> Though I thought that these sample exclusions would virtually eliminate very-low weigh babies, in practice women in the public hospital were willing to participate and even asked to be interviewed, still in cases when the baby's weight was extremely low, the delivery was preterm or the baby was in the newborn intense care unit.



arrangement classification that I explain next, which goes beyond the analyses that have been carried in Chile in terms of values so far.

## **Variables**

### ***Family Arrangements***

This paper studies attitudes and values according to the family arrangement in which first-time mothers live in. This concept combines relationship status and family size. In the sample, 33 percent of women are married, 40 percent are cohabiting, 16 percent hold a romantic relationship with the baby's father, but do not live together –who from now on I refer to as being in a visiting relationship- and about 10 percent are not romantically related to the baby's father anymore –who I will call single mothers. The size of the household is related to the respondents' economic resources. By living in extended households, unmarried mothers' may get economic and social support, and decrease their living expenses (Sigle-Rushton and McLanahan 2002). Nuclear households, on the contrary, are likely to be reserved for those who can afford independent living. Half of women in the sample (48.6 percent) live in households formed by three people, namely, the respondent, her partner and her baby<sup>4</sup>. The other half of women shares their houses with more people, which mean extended families are as common as nuclear families. Though, half of extended households are less than five people, including, most of the times, the couple, the newborn, and the child's grandparents. Just 25 percent of women live in houses that are formed by six or more people, adding other relatives or non relatives to the unit.

The living arrangements typology I use combines these four relationship statuses and two family sizes. Since just three women in each of the visiting and single groups said they live alone

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<sup>4</sup> Multiple births are counted here as one baby.

with their babies, I considered these two groups as basically extended and do not differentiate them by family size. The classification has six categories, namely, nuclear marriages, extended marriages, nuclear cohabitations, extended cohabitations, visiting, and single households. This classification allows me to compare each of the groups with each other, but also the nuclear and extended settings, and married to cohabiting or not cohabiting women. Table 1 provides a description of the sample using this classification.

Table 1: Sample Percentage Description by Family Arrangements

	Family Arrangements <sup>b</sup>						Total
	NM	EM	NC	EC	V	S	
<i>Family Arrangements %</i>	25.5	8.2	19.8	20.6	16.0	9.9	100.0
<i>Age (n=686)<sup>a</sup></i>							
18-19	1.7	8.9	9.6	29.8	37.3	33.8	18.5
20-24	9.7	21.4	35.3	46.8	41.8	39.7	31.5
25-29	36.6	23.2	25.7	15.6	15.5	22.1	24.2
30-34	38.9	35.7	20.6	5.7	1.8	4.4	18.8
35-45	13.1	10.7	8.8	2.1	3.6	0.0	7.0
Mean age	30.2	28.2	26.7	22.7	22.6	22.7	25.8
(st. dv.)	(4.5)	(5.5)	(5.8)	(4.0)	(4.7)	(3.8)	(5.7)
<i>Educational Attainment (n=686)<sup>a</sup></i>							
Sec. Incomplete	1.1	8.9	8.1	21.3	22.73	26.5	13.3
Sec. Complete	8.0	26.8	33.1	41.1	39.09	44.1	29.8
Post Sec. Technical	16.0	21.4	24.3	25.5	20	17.7	20.9
Post Sec. University	74.9	42.9	34.6	12.1	18.18	11.8	36.1
<i>Monthly per capita family income (n=681)<sup>a</sup></i>							
Less than \$US 200	6.3	33.9	33.1	71.7	72.7	76.1	44.8
\$US 200- \$US 1,000	30.5	44.6	47.8	26.8	24.6	22.4	32.6
More than \$US 1,000	63.2	21.4	19.1	1.5	2.7	1.5	22.6

a Differences by family arrangements are significant at the .001 level

b NM=nuclear marriage, EM=extended marriage, NC=nuclear cohabitation, EC=extended cohabitation, V=visiting, S=single

The first row of Table 1 shows that the sample is composed by 25 percent of married women in nuclear households, 20 percent of cohabiters in nuclear settings and 20 percent of cohabiters in extended households. Extended marriages and single households are the least common arrangements, with less than 10 percent each. The first good news that emerges from these data is that most respondents either live or hold a romantic relationship with their babies'

fathers. Thus, differently from the stereotype of unmarried mothers as abandoned women, most of unmarried mothers in this sample are not alone. That opens the possibility that the baby's fathers will be around for mothers and babies, at least in the near future.

Differences in age, education and income according to family arrangements are impressive. Married women are the oldest women in the sample, with about half of them being over 30 years old. Quite the opposite, just eight percent of cohabiters in extended households, visiting and single mothers are over 30 years old, and more than 70 percent of them are under 25 years. The age distribution of cohabiters in nuclear households resembles more that of married women than the distribution of other unmarried women. This similarity may mean that nuclear cohabitation is a stable union, where couples consolidate, and probably accumulate some assets, before planning the first child. Extended cohabitation, on the contrary, may be a response to the pregnancy, one of the new parents moving to the house of the other in order to raise the child together. These young women are likely to have not planned the pregnancy, and to live in an extended setting --probably their parents' houses-- to get financial support and help taking care of the child. The postponement of childbirth which is characteristics of the SDT, then, is just happening among married women and cohabiters in nuclear households.

Married women in nuclear households appear also as the most educated and highest income group. The second panel of Table 1 shows that 75 percent of married women in nuclear households have reached at least college education, a percentage that is still relatively high among married women in extended households and nuclear cohabiters, but it is less than 20 percent among women in the other three arrangements. Thus, besides being the youngest, women

in extended cohabitations, visiting, and single households are the least educated<sup>5</sup>. The comparison between women in nuclear and extended settings favors the former, both in marriages and cohabitations.

The last panel of Table 1 details the income distribution (monthly family income, per-capita). Differences are again marked, indicating that poverty is quite likely among cohabiters in extended houses, visiting and single mothers; and that married women in nuclear households have an income that is much higher than women in all the other groups. The income of nuclear cohabiters and married women in extended households is in between the income of nuclear married women and the set of three youngest and least educated women.

A gradient of socioeconomic wellbeing merges out of this description. Married women in nuclear households are the oldest, most educated and highest income people in the sample. They are followed by nuclear cohabiters. Married women in extended households, who are a small group, resemble the education and income of nuclear cohabiters. The set of extended cohabiters, visiting and single mothers are the youngest, and most deprived women in the sample.

### *Attitudes and Values*

The postpartum survey measures values and attitudes in four dimensions: (1) family, (2) gender equality, (3) individual autonomy, and (4) tolerance. In the family dimension, respondents were asked to compare marriage with cohabitation and singlehood, and to give their opinion about divorce and children. The questions inquired about levels of agreement (strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree) with the following statements:

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<sup>5</sup> To be sure, their youth may be one of the reasons why their educational attainment is low, since they could still be attending to school. But that seems not to be the main reason, because just 11 percent of cohabiters in extended houses, and 17 percent of visiting and single mothers are still attending to school (data not shown).

- It is better for a couple to get married than to just live together
- All in all, there are more advantages to being single than to being married
- Marriage is an outdated institution
- If couples are not happy together anymore, they should separate
- It is better for children if their parents are married
- When there are children in the family, parents should stay together even if they don't get along

Respondents were also asked how often (always, most of the times, often, a few times, never) they justify divorce.

The survey included just four questions involving gender issues. The first three have a similar format as the attitudes towards family questions, i.e., level of agreement with the following statements:

- The important decisions in the family should be made by the man of the house
- It is better for everyone if the man earns the main living
- It is better for everyone if the woman takes care of the house and family

The fourth question asked how often the respondent justifies for a man to beat his wife.

Regarding individual autonomy, women were asked to indicate their level of agreement with four statements about who is responsible for the good or bad results in their lives. They should say whether or not they believe the success one has in life depends on God's will, the social class one is born in, how hard one's work and one's will, and one's luck.

I measured tolerance towards several non-mainstream behaviors, and towards life and death decisions. I asked women how often they justify homosexuality, and what should be allowed for a couple to do in a relationship at age 18 (just kisses, kisses and hugs, any type of physical contact that does not involve having sex, having sex, or no physical contact at all). I measured tolerance towards forms of uncivil conduct asking women how often they justify

avoiding a fare in public transportation, and someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties. The questions dealing with matters of life and death asked how often the respondent justifies abortion, suicide and euthanasia. Finally, two questions deal with tolerance for deviations from strict marital morality, asking how often the respondent justifies prostitution and casual sex.

I start the analysis by describing associations between family arrangements and the individual measures of attitudes and values. For this description, I dichotomize all the variables. Questions measuring level of agreement were recoded, so that agreement with the most conservative positions equals 1, and disagreement equals zero. Questions measuring the frequency with which the respondent justifies a determined behavior were recoded in the same way, giving the value of 1 to “a few times and never” versus “always, most of the times, often”. The exception is the question about justification of a man beating his wife, for which the coding is reversed. The question about what type of contact should be allowed at age 18 was recoded giving “having sex” the value of 0, and all other answers the value of 1. All don’t know and refused answers were missed. The second part of the analysis consists in a preliminary factor analysis on the original version of the value and attitudes variables. The factor analysis aims to confirm the underlying value dimensions that emerge from these data. I use those dimensions as the outcome of a series of regressions, asking whether the association between values and family arrangement holds after adjusting for age, education, family background and religiosity.

## **RESULTS**

### **Individual Variable Description**


#### ***Family***

Figure 1 displays the distribution of the attitudes towards family issues, according to the family arrangement the respondent lives in. Most of the differences between groups are statistically significant. When evaluating marriage, marital status makes an important difference:

about 80 percent of married women think marriage is better than cohabitation, a percentage that decreases to between 50 and 30 percent among unmarried women. Likewise, married women are much more likely to think being married offers more advantages than being single. Women who live in extended households see more advantages in singlehood than those living in nuclear households, probably because of the privacy the latter setting offers.

The appraisal of marriage repeats when asking whether marriage is an outdated institution. Almost none of the married women in nuclear settings and only five percent of married women in extended households think marriage is outdated. Unmarried women are more likely to agree marriage is an outdated institution, but that percentage never exceeds 30 percent.

Figure 1 Family Attitudes by Family Arrangement<sup>a</sup>



<sup>a</sup> Associations are significant at the .001 level, except for disagreement with parents should stay together just because of children and justification of divorce, that are not significant.


Differences in the evaluation of divorce are less marked than differences in the evaluation of marriage. In general, the respondents approve divorce. More than 80 percent of women in all groups think that unhappy couples should separate, that divorce is justifiable, and that parents

who do not get along should not stay together just because of children. Even though women accept the idea of divorce, the majority thinks it is better for children if their parents are married. Married women in nuclear households are the most likely to hold that view, followed by married women in extended households, cohabiters in nuclear households, and visiting mothers. Cohabitors in extended households and single mothers are less likely to think marriage is better for children, but the proportion that agrees with that statement is still high (about 60 percent).

**Gender Equity**

Figure 2 summarizes the responses to the gender equity questions. There are no big differences in this realm: women in all groups support egalitarian ideas. The only substantial and statistically significant difference is that cohabiters in extended settings are more likely than women in other groups to think it is better for everyone if women take care of the house and family. Differences in the justification of a man hitting his wife are also statistically significant, but they are not too large: 10 percent of single women justify men who beat their wives, while less than four percent of women in all other groups do.

Figure 2 Gender Equity Attitudes by Family Arrangements<sup>a</sup>




<sup>a</sup> The only significant associations are for disagreement with preference of women taking care of the house and justification of men beating wives, which are significant at the .01 level.



### ***Individual Autonomy***

As in the gender dimension, the results on individual autonomy are quite similar between women in different family arrangements. They are also slightly contradictory: on the one hand, more than 90 percent of women the success people have in life depend on each one's work and will, but, on the other hand, about half of women, or more, think what one gets out of life depends on God's will and on luck. None of the associations in this dimension, however, are statistically significant.

Figure 3 Individual Autonomy by Family Arrangements<sup>a</sup>




<sup>a</sup> Associations are not statistically significant.

### ***Tolerance***

Questions about the justification of unconventional sex behaviors, uncivil ethics, controversial life and death decisions, and the violation of marital ethics are included under this rubric. Regarding unconventional sexual behavior, there are not significant differences according to family arrangements. About 75 percent of the respondents justify homosexuality, meaning that

25 percent does not. About half of the women think young couples should not be allowed to have sex at age 18.

Figure 4 Tolerance Attitudes by Family Arrangements<sup>a</sup>



<sup>a</sup> The only significant associations are for justification of avoiding public transportation fares and accepting bribes, which are significant at the .001 level

Instead, differences regarding uncivil ethics are statistically significant. The proportion of people who justifies avoiding the fare in public transportation is much higher among cohabiters in extended households, visiting and single mothers than among women in the other groups. That makes sense, given cohabiters in extended households, visiting and single mothers are the most economically disadvantaged, more likely to use public transportation, to experience the failures

in its functioning, and to get used to deal with such failures<sup>6</sup>. Single mothers and cohabiting women in extended households are more likely to justify people accepting bribes in the course of their duties, but overall the proportion who justifies this behavior is much lower than the proportion who justify skipping the fare in public transportation.

Finally, the views of the respondents are very similar in matters of life and death and the violation of marital ethics. About a third of women in each group, or less, justifies prostitution, and between 25 and 40 percent justify casual sex. More radically, the approval of abortion is low in all groups: over 80 percent of women never justify abortion. The justification of suicide is in the same range. About half of the respondents justify euthanasia.

The results above show that first time mothers in Chile are not as liberal as one would expect if the explanation for the high proportion of nonmarital births would be in their values. They hold liberal views in some topics, but pretty conservative ideas in others. Women seem liberal when evaluating marriage, as compared to cohabitation and singlehood, and when approving divorce. However, they do not reject marriage per se, since less than 30 percent of the sample thinks marriage is an outdated institution, and 70 percent thinks it is better for children if their parents are married, which agrees with the idea that parenthood moves people towards more conservative views. Therefore, what initially appears as disliking marriage may well be just a way to justify the marital status they currently live in.

There is no ambivalence regarding gender equity and tolerance. Respondents are straightforward in holding egalitarian gender values and they generally accept people who are different from them. Ambivalence, though, reappears when looking at individual autonomy. Most women recognize the value of one own's work and will for achieving one's goals, but they also think God's will and luck determine what happens in their lives. Conservative attitudes

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<sup>6</sup> Starting in October 2005, a new public transportation system is in effect in Santiago, and the adjustments have been slow. During peak hours, buses and the subway are crowded, people try to get in anyway, using back doors many times, and avoiding the scanner located in the front door many times.

emerge in matters of sex, and life and death. Just half of the sample thinks a couple should be allowed to have sex at age 18, and a little more than a third justifies casual sex. The approval of abortion is remarkably low, which is consistent with results from other surveys in Chile.

### **Factor Analysis and Regression Models**

With the objective of confirming that the variables I just described belong to the same underlying dimension, I perform a factor analysis of the four groups of variables. I employed the original version of the variables, instead of the dichotomous version, reversing the coding when necessary, so that all the measures uniformly go from less to more conservative views. I used principal components and varimax rotation. Factors whose eigenvalues are higher than one are retained. In the first group of variables, involving the seven family related attitudes, two factors are retained, explaining 44.3 percent of the variables' combined variance. In the first factor high loadings (over 0.5) correspond to agreement with the idea that marriage is better than cohabitation, agreement with the idea that marriage is better than singlehood, and disagreement with the idea that marriage is an outdated institution. I call this factor *preference for marriage*. In the second factor, high loadings correspond to disagreement with the idea that unhappy married people should separate and to low justification of divorce. I call this factor *disapproval of divorce*.

In the second group of variables, the four variables involving gender attitudes, just one factor is retained, which explain 44.4 percent of the variables' combined variance. The variables that load high in this factor are agreement with the idea that men should make the important decisions in a family, agreement with the idea that men should earn the main living, and agreement with the idea women should take care of the house and the family. I call this factor *machismo*.


The third group of variables deals with autonomy, and the analysis also led to only one factor, with high loadings for agreement with the ideas that people's success in life depend on

God’s will, on the social class one is born into, and on luck. This factor explains 33.7 percent of the four variables’ combined variance. I call this factor *fatalism*.

Finally, the fourth group of variables, including nine tolerance measures, leads to two factors. The first includes high loadings for low justification of homosexuality, of abortion, of suicide, of euthanasia, of prostitution, and of casual sex. The second factor has high loadings for low justification for avoiding paying the fare in public transportation and for accepting bribes. These two factors explain 42.9 percent of the nine variables’ combined variance. I call the first factor *conventional moral* and the second *solid civil ethic*.

Figure 5 graphs the mean of these six factors according to family arrangements. The larger differences are in the preference for marriage factor. Differences in all the other factors are comparatively smaller, which is consistent with the results I presented when considering each variable as an individual indicator.

Figure 5 Emerging Value-Dimensions by Family Arrangements



I use these factors to generate dichotomous variables that will be the outcome in a series of regression models. I assign the value of 1 to people who score in the upper 25 percent of each

factor, this is to say, to the most conservative people, and values of 0 to everybody else. I then run six logistic models, including family arrangements, age, education, the intact/non-intact character of the respondent's family of origin, and religiosity as covariates. I include age and education as a set of dummy variables. Religiosity is an additive index, that sums up the answers to two questions: how often does the respondent go to church (several times a week, once a week, once a month, a few times a year, once a year, less often than that, never), and how important is religion in the respondent's life (the most important thing in life, very important, some important, not very important, not important at all). It ranges from two to twelve.

The results are shown in Table 2. After considering sociodemographic controls and religiosity, family arrangements have a significant effect on the preference for marriage, the disapproval of divorce, and fatalism. Regarding the preference for marriage, unmarried women are less likely to like marriage than married women<sup>7</sup>. Specifically, depending in the family arrangement they live in, they are in between 87 and 95 percent less likely to prefer marriage. Regarding the disapproval of divorce, cohabiters in nuclear households are 53 percent less likely to disapprove divorce, in other words, more likely to approve divorce, than married women in nuclear settings. Women in other groups did not differ significantly in their disapproval of divorce from married women in nuclear households. It must be recalled, though, that most women actually approve divorce, in any group. Finally, regarding fatalism, women in a visiting relationship are 58% less likely to hold fatalistic views about their destinies than married women in nuclear households, who, as seen in Figure 5, have a negative score in this dimension.

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<sup>7</sup> The odds ratio for married women in extended housesold is not significant, so I can not be claimed they differ from married women in nuclear households –the reference group--in this realm.

Table 7.2 Value-Dimensions Models

Variables	Preference for marriage		Disapproval of divorce		Machismo		Fatalism		Conventional moral		Solid civil ethics	
	OR	SE B	OR	SE B	OR	SE B	OR	SE B	OR	SE B	OR	SE B
<i>Family Arrangements (ref=nuclear married)</i>												
Ext married	0.736	0.262	0.546	0.214	1.463	0.610	0.825	0.320	0.827	0.319	0.992	0.361
Nuc cohab	0.137***	0.047	0.477*	0.149	0.992	0.353	0.761	0.233	0.819	0.255	0.842	0.249
Ext cohab	0.058***	0.027	0.531†	0.177	1.230	0.460	1.135	0.363	0.674	0.228	1.622	0.540
Visiting	0.052***	0.026	0.988	0.322	0.716	0.292	0.420*	0.157	0.763	0.267	1.637	0.575
Single	0.080***	0.042	0.711	0.271	0.909	0.393	0.679	0.263	0.441†	0.189	1.047	0.455
<i>Age (ref=18-19)</i>												
20-24	0.768	0.347	1.120	0.335	1.179	0.351	1.482	0.436	1.335	0.398	1.996†	0.809
25-29	0.650	0.324	0.812	0.287	1.026	0.370	1.410	0.481	0.919	0.326	3.604**	1.559
30-34	0.627	0.333	0.837	0.336	0.792	0.352	1.340	0.527	0.640	0.267	4.120**	1.934
35-45	0.367	0.225	0.648	0.320	0.813	0.456	0.894	0.474	0.980	0.481	3.748*	1.983
<i>Education (ref=less than high school)</i>												
HS diploma	0.712	0.339	1.395	0.471	0.377**	0.112	0.909	0.280	1.291	0.410	1.003	0.419
Tech postsec	0.766	0.404	1.404	0.531	0.161***	0.062	0.805	0.281	0.584	0.223	1.888	0.808
Univ postsec	1.466	0.756	1.448	0.561	0.219***	0.083	0.377*	0.142	0.601	0.231	2.799	1.201
<i>Intact family of origin</i>	0.993	0.244	1.117	0.222	0.836	0.179	1.104	0.217	1.104	0.225	0.755	0.154
<i>Religiosity</i>	1.304***	0.066	1.045	0.040	1.130**	0.050	1.062	0.041	1.245***	0.053	1.023	0.040
<i>n</i>	616		616		659		653		648		648	
$\chi^2$	206.87		17.26		49.94		30.58		53.22		59.74	
<i>Df</i>												

Age just has a significant effect on the solid civil ethics factor, older women being more likely to score positively on that dimension, regardless the family arrangement they live in, their education level, family structure while growing up, and religiosity score. Education has a significant effect on two factors, *machismo* and fatalism. More educated women are less likely to hold unequal gender attitudes –they are 63 percent less likely to be *machista* if they have a high school diploma, and 78 percent less likely if they have at least some college, as compared to women who have not completed high school. In the case of fatalism, the only significant coefficient is for women who have at least some college education. They are 63 percent less likely to hold fatalistic attitudes about what happens in their lives than women without a high school diploma. The last sociodemographic control, the structure of the family where the respondent grew up in (intact/non-intact), has not significant effect on any of the values and attitudes' outcomes in these models.

On the contrary, religiosity has a significant effect on several factors: preference for marriage, *machismo*, and conventional morals. The effect of religiosity, after considering family arrangements and sociodemographic controls, is positive in the three cases, that is to say, more religious women are more likely to prefer marriage, to disapprove divorce and to adhere to conventional morals in matters of life and death, and sex. Specifically, every extra point in the religiosity index increases the odds of preferring marriage by 30 percent, the odds of holding unequal gender attitudes by 13 percent, and the odds of supporting conventional morals by 24.5 percent. Considering the extremes of the religiosity index, that means that the most religious women are 13 times more likely to prefer marriage, 11 times more likely to be *machistas*, and 12 times more likely to be conventional in matter of life and death, and sex, than the least religious women in the sample.




These results show family arrangements are related to attitudes and values, as well as religiosity, and, to a lower extent, education and age. However, they also stress that besides the preference for marriage's dimension, differences in values and attitudes among women in different family arrangements are little. As mentioned above, it may be that, among unmarried women, what appears as disliking marriage is just a way to self-justify their marital status. This explanation seems reasonable when looking at unmarried women's expectations of a wedding happening in the future. The postpartum survey asked unmarried women in union whether they were planning to marry the baby's father, and how likely they think the wedding was. As seen in Figure 6, most unmarried women in a relationship plan to marry the baby's father, even though there are large differences according to the family arrangement they live in. Cohabiting women in nuclear households are more likely to plan to marry than cohabiters in extended households, and much more than women in a visiting relationship. Just 40 percent of women in the latter group have talk to their partners about either getting married or living together first and then getting married. Women in a visiting relationship are younger and 90 percent of them live with their parents. Having their parents' support, it is likely that visiting mothers prioritize finishing their education and starting a career instead of marrying<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> However, and not shown here, about half of women in a visiting relationship have talked to their partners about starting to live together, which reduce the proportion having no co-residential plans to about 10 percent (14 women).

Figure 6 Marital Intentions by Family Arrangements, Unmarried Women in Union



The right hand of Figure 6 show how likely the respondents think it is for them to marry their partners, which is a twist to the former question. The results are similar; in fact, putting together the answers of women saying they think there is a high or a 50-50 chance for the wedding to happen, marital intentions are even higher than when asking whether or not they plan to marry. Given that most women in nontraditional family arrangements do not remove marriage from their expectations, it is not possible to sustain they reject marriage on an ideological basis, as the SDT discourse would argue.

## **DISCUSSION**

The results from this study do not provide evidence for thinking the typical SDT explanation applies to the Chilean case. There are not important differences in attitudes and values between women in different family arrangements, except for the preference for marriage, but in this case the results probably reflect a self-justification of unmarried women's marital status and not their real preference for marriage, because most unmarried women in a romantic relationship are planning to marry.

The SDT discussion strongly argues that values are driving changes in fertility and family behaviors, and that the phenomenon will eventually become universal, in the same way that it was proposed for the classical demographic transition. The proponents of the SDT make room in their theory for different mixes of the demographic indicators of the phenomenon, but the lack of value differences I found simply does not agree with the theory. Since other countries that the SDT defendants have not performed and analysis as the one I present in this study, it may well be that a similar lack of liberalism in family and sex values repeats in other contexts that show impressive SDT indicators. The increase of cohabitation and the large proportion of children born outside of marriage in Chile probably respond to reasons other than values. They are likely to reflect socioeconomic selectivity, the least advantaged groups being less likely to afford marriage, but also a phenomenon that is intriguingly out of the SDT discourse: unplanned fertility. Likely, many of the births to unmarried, young women were not planned, especially considering the absence of sexual education in the Chilean schooling system. Chilean women may be deciding just to bear the baby, without getting married immediately, but also without discarding marriage in the future. If that is what is

happening, then we can argue that family related values are changing in Chile, because the stigma that a nonmarital birth used to carry somehow is not there anymore. The values that the SDT highlight, though – values related to higher order needs and demands of self-actualization – seem to be largely out of the Chilean landscape.

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